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I. INTRODUCTION 
Over the last twenty years, the incidence of investor-state arbitrations, 
starting from a few odd cases per year, has grown to a sizable and steady flow 
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of up to forty-some new cases annually.1 With a cumulative total of at least 
317 pending or decided cases as of the end of 2008—most of them before 
International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) arbitral 
tribunals constituted under the ICSID Convention2—international investment 
arbitration has become “a part of the ‘normal’ investment landscape.”3 The 
growth in investor-state arbitrations has been fostered by the explosion in the 
number of bilateral investment treaties (BITs) during the same time period, 
which numbered a staggering 2676 treaties at the end of 2008.4 Many of these 
treaties contain provisions not only about the settlement of traditional 
interstate disputes, but also about procedures through which investors 
claiming to have been harmed by measures allegedly in violation of an 
applicable BIT provision can initiate arbitrations directly against the 
investment host state. It is on the basis of such dispute settlement provisions 
contained in BITs that most investor-state arbitrations are being initiated.5 
The growth in investor-state arbitration has gone hand in hand with a 
diversification of the issues at stake in the underlying disputes. Far from being 
limited to merely technical questions, contemporary investment arbitrations 
frequently implicate the scope of the regulatory powers of the respondent 
states and reach well beyond the traditional concerns with simple 
expropriations and nationalizations. Instead, a much broader variety of 
regulatory and public goods disputes has come to be addressed through 
investment arbitration, ranging from the provision of basic public services, 
such as water and sanitation, to the maintenance of public order. The large 
number of arbitrations initiated against Argentina arising out of that country’s 
responses to the severe economic crisis from 2001 to 2002—forty-eight 
known proceedings in 20096—fittingly illustrate this point. They implicate 
                                                                                                                                                                         
1. See U.N. Conf. on Trade & Dev. [UNCTAD], Latest Developments in Investor-State 
Dispute Settlement, IIA Monitor No. 1, at 2, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/WEB/DIAE/IA/2009/6/Rev1 (2009), 
available at http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/webdiaeia20096_en.pdf. 
2. Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of 
Other States, Mar. 18, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1270, 575 U.N.T.S. 159 [hereinafter ICSID Convention]. The 
Convention does not contain any substantive investment protection standards but instead provides states 
and investors with an institutional framework—through the creation of the International Centre for 
Settlement of Investment Disputes—that they can use to settle their investment disputes by way of 
conciliation or arbitration. For that purpose, and similar to the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The 
Hague, the Centre makes available panels of qualified conciliators and arbitrators, id. arts. 12-16, from 
which the disputing parties can choose, and provides basic rules for the constitution of arbitral tribunals 
and the procedures to be followed before them. Arbitration proceedings commence at the request of a 
contracting party or one of its nationals, id. art. 36, para. 1, and result in a binding award, id. art. 53, 
para. 1. Unless the parties agree on the body of rules to be applied, the tribunal shall base its decision on 
the domestic law of the state party to the dispute and any applicable rules of international law. Id. art. 
42, para. 1. Contracting states pledge to execute any pecuniary obligations contained in an award within 
their domestic legal systems “as if it were a final judgment of a court in that State.” Id. art. 54, para. 1. 
While the review of an award as such is excluded, either party may request either a revision or the 
annulment of the award on the basis of an exclusive list of admissible grounds. Id. arts. 51-52. Many 
BITs include referral to ICSID as one of the provided dispute settlement mechanisms. 
3. Latest Developments in Investor-State Dispute Settlement, supra note 1, at 2.  
4. UNCTAD, Recent Developments in International Investment Agreements (2008-June 
2009), IIA Monitor No. 3, at 2, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/WEB/DIAE/IA/2009/8 (2009), available at 
http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/webdiaeia20098_en.pdf.  
5. Latest Developments in Investor-State Dispute Settlement, supra note 1, at 3. 
6. Id. 
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nothing less than the host state’s freedom and ability to speedily react to an 
economic collapse of massive proportions. 
Given these combined quantitative and qualitative changes, it is time to 
recognize that contemporary investor-state arbitrations are not merely another 
form of private law commercial arbitration, with one party now being a state, 
but that they are more fittingly understood as a form of dispute settlement that, 
like many domestic judicial proceedings, also operates in a public law 
context.7 Many of the ICSID arbitrations currently pending against Argentina 
and other states raise issues that can only be properly understood as public law 
questions. Yet many ICSID tribunals continue to employ standards of review 
developed from the private law origins of international arbitration. As a result, 
the perceived legitimacy8 of investor-state arbitration has come under threat in 
recent years in the eyes of some states. Ecuador and Bolivia, for instance, 
have denounced the ICSID Convention and other states, such as Argentina, 
Venezuela, and Nicaragua, have threatened to do so.9 Even from within the 
system, an annulment committee constituted under the ICSID Convention to 
review an award rendered by an ICSID tribunal against Argentina has 
scathingly critiqued the jurisprudential approach of the first-instance tribunal 
and raised larger questions about the system’s legitimacy.10 
We argue that the strict standards of review employed by many arbitral 
tribunals, while perhaps appropriate in commercial arbitration or in the 
context of specific technical questions, may be inappropriate with respect to 
many issues raised in modern investor-state arbitrations that are, at heart, 
public law questions. These public law questions require a tribunal to 
determine the state’s basic powers, the extent of the state’s ability to regulate 
in the public interest, and the state’s capacity to make basic socioeconomic 
and political choices. We contend that part of the growing perception of a 
legitimacy gap in investor-state arbitration stems from the inappropriate 
standards of review applied by those tribunals when adjudicating public law 
elements of state conduct and from a lack of clear jurisprudential foundations 
for the choice of applicable standards of review. Further, we argue that in 
                                                                                                                                                                         
7. We understand “public law” here to refer to arbitrations for which the critical issue on 
which the outcome turns to be whether the state has the power and legal ability to undertake regulation 
in the public interest. See, e.g., Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 59 
HARV. L. REV. 1281, 1302 (1976); L. Harold Levinson, The Public Law/Private Law Distinction in the 
Courts, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1579 (1989) (discussing the legal distinctions between public and 
private law). 
8. As an analytical and normative category in both law and politics, “legitimacy” has been 
the subject of an extensive literature of its own, which we cannot review in any detail here. In this 
Article, we adopt a general understanding of legitimacy “as relating to the justification and acceptance 
of political authority.” Daniel Bodansky, The Concept of Legitimacy in International Law, in 
LEGITIMACY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 309, 310 (Rüdiger Wolfrum & Volker Röben eds., 2009). In the 
case of ICSID, that political authority is exercised by ad hoc judicial bodies, that is, the arbitral tribunals 
constituted under it. At a minimum, and in line with Thomas Franck’s position, judicial legitimacy is 
enhanced to the extent that proceedings are seen as having been procedurally fair. See THOMAS M. 
FRANCK, FAIRNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INSTITUTIONS 7 (1995). Procedural fairness and 
legitimacy are implicated in how a court or tribunal chooses the standard of review employed in a given 
area of law. 
9. See infra notes 84-89 and accompanying text. 
10. See CMS Gas Transmission Co. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/08, 
Decision on Annulment, ¶¶ 95, 96-97, 125, 136, 146, 158 (Sept. 25, 2007), http://icsid.worldbank.org/ 
ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=showDoc&docId=DC687_En&caseId=C4. 
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order to maintain the legitimacy of investor-state arbitration, not only from the 
investors’ perspective, but also from that of respondent states, arbitral 
tribunals must adopt a more appropriate standard of review11 for distinctly 
public law disputes or issues. Those standards should be derived not from the 
private law origins of international arbitration, but rather from the far more 
analogous situational context of comparative public law. As a result, such 
standards will have a more coherent jurisprudential foundation. Those 
standards will be, at times, more deferential to states’ public law regulatory 
choices, yet will simultaneously protect legitimate investor interests. We 
argue that although a range of potential standards of review could be derived 
from a comparative public law approach, including a least restrictive 
alternative or proportionality analysis, due to the peculiar institutional 
capacity12 of ad hoc arbitral tribunals, the most appropriate standard for the 
resolution of public law arbitrations is the “margin of appreciation” standard 
as developed by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) and 
increasingly adopted by other tribunals.13 
The crux of our argument is that the current standards of review utilized 
by investor-state arbitral tribunals are poorly suited for the public law subject 
matter that is now the focus of many arbitrations. We therefore call for a 
significant shift in the way in which arbitrators review state behavior. Our 
approach recognizes that arbitral tribunals often lack critical expertise in 
public law adjudication and are rarely embedded within the political 
communities whose public policy they review. We argue that importing a 
standard of review based on the margin of appreciation can help restore the 
legitimacy of the ICSID system and can give arbitrators a tractable standard to 
apply, commensurate with both the nature of public law disputes and the 
relative positioning of investor-state arbitral tribunals in the international 
system. Implementing a standard of review based on the margin of 
                                                                                                                                                                         
11. For the purpose of this Article, we adopt the mainstream definition of “standard of 
review” as relating to “the nature and intensity of review by a court or tribunal of decisions taken by 
another governmental authority or, sometimes, by a lower court or tribunal.” Jan Bohanes & Nicolas 
Lockhart, Standard of Review in WTO Law, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW 
378, 379 (Daniel Bethlehem et al. eds., 2009). 
12. Institutional capacity can be broadly defined as an institution’s “ability to perform 
functions, solve problems, and set and achieve objectives.” Sakiko Fukuda-Parr, Carlos Lopes & Khalid 
Malik, Overview: Institutional Innovations for Capacity Development, in CAPACITY FOR DEVELOPMENT: 
NEW SOLUTIONS TO OLD PROBLEMS 1, 8 (Sakiko Fukuda-Parr, Carlos Lopes & Khalid Malik eds., 
2002). Contemporary uses of the concept generally recognize different dimensions that affect and 
determine institutional capacity, which may include staff, organizational structure, and material 
resources, but also a number of environmental factors such as the regulatory frameworks and the norms 
and values of the broader society within which institutions operate. See Org. for Econ. Co-operation & 
Dev. [OECD], Institutional Capacity and Climate Actions, OECD Doc. COM/ENV/EPOC/IEA/SLT 
(Nov. 2003) (prepared by Stéphane Willems & Kevin Baumert), available at http://www.iea.org/ 
work/2004/cop10/aixg/institutional_capacity.pdf. In Part V, infra, we highlight expertise as the key 
critical element in the institutional capacity of courts and tribunals in general, and in ICSID ad hoc 
arbitral tribunals in particular. 
13. While others have noted the possible utility of the “margin of appreciation” in investment 
arbitration, they have not provided a coherent argument for its application or a detailed treatment of the 
implications of such a standard of review in investment arbitration. See Barnali Choudhury, Recapturing 
Public Power: Is Investment Arbitration’s Engagement of the Public Interest Contributing to the 
Democratic Deficit?, 41 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 775, 827 (2008) (“Overall, use of the margin-of-
appreciation doctrine on a case-by-case basis allows for the inclusion of public interest issues into 
investment treaties . . . .”). 
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appreciation in public law arbitrations would significantly change the 
character of such dispute settlement and, admittedly, might reduce protections 
for investors in some circumstances. But, such a standard of review would 
better align with the character of both public law disputes and investor-state 
arbitral tribunals, thereby enhancing much needed perceptions of legitimacy in 
the ICSID system. 
Notably, our approach differs from that of Alec Stone Sweet, who has 
led a small group of scholars advocating the use of proportionality analysis in 
investor-state arbitration. We differ with them because, unlike Stone Sweet, 
we base our argument on the changing subject matter of investor-state 
arbitrations toward public law and because we believe a standard of review 
based on the margin of appreciation is more appropriate to the relative 
expertise and embeddedness of such tribunals. In Part V in particular, we use 
Stone Sweet’s work as a counterpoint to highlight the distinct nature of the 
margin of appreciation as a standard of review separate from proportionality 
analysis.  
Our argument proceeds in four parts. Part II substantiates our contention 
that elements of many contemporary investor-state disputes are best seen in 
the context of public law rather than commercial, private law. Part III 
addresses the shortcomings in the standards of review employed by many 
investment arbitral tribunals, especially in the context of arbitrations against 
Argentina relating to that country’s economic and political crisis in 2001 to 
2002, the growing perception of a legitimacy gap in investor-state arbitration, 
and the need for alternative standards for reviewing state public law 
regulation. Part IV then places the standards used by ICSID tribunals to date 
in the context of available alternative standards through a comparative public 
law analysis at both the international and domestic levels. That comparative 
analysis reveals that judicial deference to political decisionmakers is 
widespread, normatively legitimate, and relatively consistently applied—
especially where they are better placed to assess factual circumstances and 
make decisions accordingly. Part V delineates what we contend is the best 
way forward in adjusting the standard of review in investment arbitration to 
the increasingly public-law-related substance matter at stake in many investor-
state disputes. We note that while proportionality-based approaches are 
preferable to the currently prevailing approach, adoption of the margin of 
appreciation is more appropriate to the unique context of ad hoc international 
arbitration for reasons of institutional capacity and expertise. Part VI 
concludes. 
II. INVESTMENT ARBITRATION AS PUBLIC LAW  
International economic disputes, and particularly international 
arbitrations, have often been understood as private law disputes.14 From its 
                                                                                                                                                                         
14. See, e.g., David Kennedy, The International Style in Postwar Law and Policy, 1994 UTAH 
L. REV. 7, 63 (“[W]e read the move to international economic law as the displacement of one discipline 
by another—from public law to private law, from a concern with national sovereignty to an international 
order removed from sovereign forms, from law to policy, and from adjudication to administration, with 
economics replacing politics as law’s sidekick and nemesis.”); Joel R. Paul, The Isolation of Private 
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inception, international commercial arbitration offered a mechanism through 
which private actors could engage in third party settlement of largely 
contractual disputes. 15  While classical international commercial arbitration 
was rightly seen in this private law context, the rise of investment treaty 
arbitration after the proliferation of BITs in the 1990s16 has opened a vast new 
realm of international economic adjudication. Recently, commentators have 
come to recognize that, unlike much earlier international economic law and, 
particularly, international commercial arbitration, investment treaty arbitration 
is now best understood in a public law, rather than private law, context.17 Yet 
in practice, investment treaty arbitration still continues to operate as if it were 
purely private law. 18  Importantly for our purposes, investment treaty 
arbitrators still apply standards of review developed from arbitration’s private 
contract law origins. Today, these private law approaches are incompatible 
with and inappropriate to investment treaty arbitration’s new public law 
functions. 
Admittedly, the distinctions between public law and private law are not 
always clear, particularly in states that do not follow Roman law’s traditional 
division between the two.19 For our purposes, it is not necessary, nor perhaps 
even possible, to cleanly separate public and private law in all spheres. Rather, 
what is necessary is to identify arbitrations or issues within arbitrations that 
raise public law issues. The arbitrations that we would classify as falling 
within the public law sphere are those in which the outcome-determinative 
issue in the arbitration requires a determination of the state’s power and legal 
authority to undertake regulation in the public interest.20 That is distinct from 
a private law arbitration, in which the tribunal might be required to determine, 
                                                                                                                                                                         
International Law, 7 WIS. INT’L L.J. 149 (1988).  
15. See generally HERSCH LAUTERPACHT, PRIVATE LAW SOURCES AND ANALOGIES OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW: WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION (1927) (discussing 
the private law basis of international arbitration). 
16. See UNCTAD, Bilateral Investment Treaties 1959-1999, at 25-123, U.N. Doc. 
UNCTAD/ITE/IIA/2 (Dec. 2000) (prepared by Abraham Negash), available at http://www.unctad.org/ 
en/docs/poiteiiad2.en.pdf; Zachary Elkins, Andrew T. Guzman & Beth A. Simmons, Competing for 
Capital: The Diffusion of Bilateral Investment Treaties, 1960-2000, 60 INT’L ORG. 811 (2006); Jeswald 
W. Salacuse & Nicholas P. Sullivan, Do BITs Really Work?: An Evaluation of Bilateral Investment 
Treaties and Their Grand Bargain, 46 HARV. INT’L L.J. 67, 75 (2005). 
17. See GUS VAN HARTEN, INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION AND PUBLIC LAW (2007); Gus 
Van Harten & Martin Loughlin, Investment Treaty Arbitration as a Species of Global Administrative 
Law, 17 EUR. J. INT’L L. 121 (2006). 
18. In some limited respects, investment treaty arbitration has begun to move in this public 
law direction through, for example, allowing amicus briefs. See Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de 
Barcelona, S.A. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/19, Order in Response to a Petition by 
Five Non-Governmental Organizations for Permission to Make Amicus Curiae Submissions (Feb. 12, 
2007), http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=showDoc& 
docId=DC519_En&caseId=C19 (permitting parties that were not party to the case to submit amicus 
curiae briefs). 
19. See Levinson, supra note 7, at 1585-86. 
20. See Chayes, supra note 7, at 1302; see also Levinson, supra note 7, at 1593 (“[T]he 
concept of public law, in today’s society, recognizes the existence of a government that may legitimately 
exercise some powers unavailable to private parties, such as the powers of taxation, currency control, 
eminent domain, law enforcement, and military and foreign affairs. The government is, in turn, obliged 
to exercise its powers in the public interest, within the bounds established by the Constitution and other 
law.”). 
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say, whether the state made a particular payment or fulfilled a contractual 
provision.  
At the very least, much of investment treaty arbitration today must be 
understood as public regulatory or administrative law. Gus Van Harten 
describes investment arbitration as “a uniquely internationalized arm of the 
governing apparatus of states, one that employs arbitration to review and 
control the exercise of public authority,”21 resulting in “a unique form of 
public law adjudication” 22  which “is used to resolve regulatory disputes 
between individuals and the state as opposed to reciprocal disputes between 
private parties or between states.”23 Given its regulatory character, Van Harten 
and Martin Loughlin characterize investment arbitration “as a comprehensive 
form of global administrative law.”24 Similarly, Barnali Choudhury contends 
that “the arbitrators governing these [investment] disputes are now regularly 
reviewing . . . domestic public interest issues.”25 Asha Kaushal notes that 
investment tribunals “outside of the state apparatus . . . subject public 
regulatory state actions to scrutiny.”26 And Cai Congyan concludes that in 
contrast to earlier investment arbitrations, which often arose in response to 
economically motivated expropriations by host states, “[m]any indirect 
expropriation claims since the 1990s . . . challenged host states’ measures, 
which have nothing to do with economic consideration, but intend to protect 
fundamental public goods, for example, environment, public health, and 
national security.”27 
At least some investment arbitration today may transcend even the 
public regulatory or administrative context and play a quasi-constitutional 
function. Modern investment arbitration often deals not just with traditional 
issues of expropriation 28  or national treatment 29  that would constitute 
regulatory or administrative disputes, but also with disputes that legitimate or 
invalidate exercises of regulatory power and, in extreme cases, even the 
fundamental rights of citizens within the state.  
The set of arbitrations brought against Argentina after the country’s 
economic collapse in late 2001 exemplifies this new feature of investment 
                                                                                                                                                                         
21. VAN HARTEN, supra note 17, at 70. 
22. Id. at 10. 
23. Id. at 4.  
24. Van Harten & Loughlin, supra note 17, at 123. 
25. Choudhury, supra note 13, at 778. Choudhury continues, “investment arbitrations engage 
the public interest when they implicate issues concerning the common interest, such as . . . the best 
interest of the state and its citizens.” Id. at 792.  
26. Asha Kaushal, Revisiting History: How the Past Matters for the Present Backlash Against 
the Foreign Investment Regime, 50 HARV. INT’L L.J. 491, 518 (2009). 
27. Cai Congyan, China-US BIT Negotiations and the Future of Investment Treaty Regime: A 
Grand Bilateral Bargain with Multilateral Implications, 12 J. INT’L ECON. L. 457, 477 (2009). 
28. See, e.g., Metalclad Corp. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/97/1, 
Award (Aug. 30, 2000), http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&action 
Val=showDoc&docId=DC542_En&caseId=C155 (addressing how to determine whether expropriation 
has occurred within the NAFTA framework). 
29. Loewen Group, Inc. v. United States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)98/3, Award (June 26, 
2003), http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/22094.pdf; ADF Group Inc. v. United States, 
ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/00/1, Award (Jan. 9, 2003), http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/ 
16586.pdf; Maffezini v. Kingdom of Spain, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/7, Award (Nov. 13, 2000), 
http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=showDoc&docId=D
C566_En&caseId=C163.  
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arbitration. In the last weeks of 2001, Argentina experienced a financial 
collapse of catastrophic proportions.30 In response to the crisis, which has 
been likened to the Great Depression of the 1930s in the United States,31 
Argentina adopted a number of measures to stabilize the economy and restore 
political confidence. Among these efforts was a significant devaluation of the 
peso through the termination of the currency board that had pegged the peso 
to the U.S. dollar, the pesification of all financial obligations, 32  and the 
effective freezing of all bank accounts through a series of measures known 
collectively as the Corralito.33 Thereafter, Argentina has become subject to no 
fewer than forty-three ICSID arbitrations brought by investors who assert that 
Argentina’s response to the crisis harmed investments protected by various 
BITs, violating fair and equitable treatment clauses or constituting indirect 
expropriation.34 Each of the cases against Argentina discussed in this Article 
is based on this same set of underlying facts, as investors challenged various 
aspects of Argentina’s recovery package and its impacts, particularly in the oil 
and gas, transportation, and banking sectors. Argentina’s potential liability 
from these cases alone could be greater than US$8 billion, more than the 
entire financial reserves of the Argentine government in 2002.35  
Argentina’s legal response to the cases brought by U.S. investors has 
largely relied on particular BIT provisions that allow a state to take actions for 
the protection of its essential security or the maintenance of public order.36 
Specifically, Argentina has presented two arguments in the alternative. First, 
Argentina has argued that the nonprecluded measures (NPM) provisions of its 
BIT with the United States, which permit actions necessary to protect a treaty 
partner’s essential security interests,37 are self-judging and that Argentina was, 
consequentially, entitled to invoke this provision as a defense to investor 
                                                                                                                                                                         
30. See PAUL BLUSTEIN, AND THE MONEY KEPT ROLLING IN (AND OUT): WALL STREET, THE 
IMF, AND THE BANKRUPTING OF ARGENTINA 1-2 (2005). For a discussion of the economic background 
to the collapse, see Mario Damill, Roberto Frenkel & Martín Rapetti, The Argentinean Debt: History, 
Default and Restructuring, in OVERCOMING DEVELOPING COUNTRY DEBT CRISES 179 (Barry Herman, 
Jose Antonio Ocampo & Shari Spiegal eds., 2010). 
31. See, e.g., Liberty’s Great Advance: Liberalism Has Brought Sharp Reductions in Both 
Poverty and International Inequality, ECONOMIST, June 28, 2003, at 4, 6 (“Argentina has endured an 
economic collapse to match the Great Depression of the 1930s . . . .”). 
32. See Law No. 25561, Jan. 7, 2002, 29810 B.O. 1, available at http://infoleg.mecon.gov.ar/ 
infolegInternet/verNorma.do?id=71477. 
33. See Decree No. 1570/2001, Dec. 3, 2001, 29787 B.O. 1, available at http://infoleg.mecon. 
gov.ar/infolegInternet/verNorma.do?id=70355. For a recounting of the key measures taken in response 
to the crisis, see, for example, Brad Setser & Anna Gelpern, Pathways Through Financial Crisis: 
Argentina, 12 GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 465, 470-79 (2006). 
34. For a list of concluded and pending cases before ICSID, see International Centre for 
Settlement of Investment Disputes, http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/cases/cases.htm (last visited Mar. 
28, 2010). 
35. Gabriel Bottini, Counsel, Office of the Att’y Gen., Republic of Arg., Issues of Jurisdiction 
and Merits Arising from the Argentine Litigation at ICSID, Lecture at the University of Pennsylvania 
Journal of International Economic Law Symposium: International Investment and Transnational 
Litigation: Challenges of Growing and Expanding Investor State Disputes (Feb. 2, 2007).  
36. See generally William W. Burke-White & Andreas von Staden, Investment Protection in 
Extraordinary Times: The Interpretation and Application of Nonprecluded Measures Provisions in 
Bilateral Investment Treaties, 48 VA. J. INT’L L. 307 (2008) (analyzing exceptions to substantive 
standards of protection included in bilateral investment treaties with a view to safeguarding, inter alia, a 
state’s essential security interests and public order). 
37. See, e.g., Treaty Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Investment, 
U.S.-Arg., art. XI, Nov. 14, 1991, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 103-2 [hereinafter U.S.-Argentina BIT]. 
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claims.38 Second, Argentina has argued that even if the NPM clauses are not 
self-judging, the requirements of the essential security and public order 
provisions of the U.S.-Argentina BIT were met, which in turn relieved 
Argentina of any liability.39 
The defenses on which many of these arbitrations against Argentina 
have turned move well beyond traditional private law conceptions of 
international arbitration and into the realm of public law. These arbitrations 
have come to assume the character of quasi-constitutional disputes—not 
constitutional in the sense of implicating changes to the state’s written 
constitution, but constitutional in the sense that they relate to changes to the 
state’s economic and social constitution, even beyond the regulatory or 
administrative model of international arbitration advanced by Van Harten and 
Loughlin. The scope of what can qualify as Argentina’s essential security 
interests, for example, strikes at the very core of state sovereignty and the 
primary function of government,40 and at least in the Argentine understanding, 
the notion of “public order” also encompasses the role of functioning 
governmental institutions.41 More generally, Argentina’s ability to develop a 
political and economic response to the extraordinary financial collapse 
implicated the state’s ability to meet its citizens’ basic needs and to ensure 
their fundamental rights. At the very least, these disputes set two primary 
values against one another: the rights of investors guaranteed by the 
applicable BIT and the ability of the state to pursue its most basic objectives 
of providing domestic order, peace, and stability. To the degree that 
investment treaty arbitrations contrast such values and turn on basic issues of 
state identity and fundamental rights, rather than on fact, attribution, or 
damages, they become public law disputes and even begin to evidence aspects 
of constitutional adjudication.42 
                                                                                                                                                                         
38. CMS Gas Transmission Co. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8, Award, ¶¶ 
332-355 (May 12, 2005), http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&action 
Val=showDoc&docId=DC687_En&caseId=C4. For further discussion, see Burke-White & von Staden, 
supra note 36. 
39. See CMS, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8, Award, ¶¶ 332-355. 
40. In a different context, Judge Hersch Lauterpacht has recognized that it is “doubtful 
whether any tribunal acting judicially can override the assertion of a State that a dispute affects its 
security.” HERSCH LAUTERPACHT, THE FUNCTION OF LAW IN THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY 188 
(1933). 
41. The equally authoritative Spanish language version of the U.S.-Argentina BIT uses the 
term “orden público.” See Tratado Suscripto con los Estados Unidos de América Sobre la Promoción y 
Protección Recíproca de Inversiones, Sept. 21, 1992, art. XI, http://www.eumed.net/libros/2005/ 
lg/a05.htm. It should be noted that the civil law concept of “ordre public,” originating in France with the 
Napoleonic Code, is broader in scope than its English-language cognate and is generally understood to 
encompass a country’s basic value system as a whole, expressed not only through its criminal laws but 
through all of its domestic legislation and regulations. See Ignaz Seidl-Hohenveldern, Ordre Public 
(Public Order), in 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 788, 788-89 (Rudolf Bernhardt ed., 
1997); Wyndham A. Bewes, Public Order (Ordre Public), 37 L.Q.R. 315, 318 (1921). The concept of 
“orden público” has been part of Argentine law since at least 1869, when it was included in Article 14 of 
the country’s Civil Code. See Max Habicht, The Application of Soviet Laws and the Exception of Public 
Order, 21 AM. J. INT’L L. 238, 241 (1927). 
42. See MILTON KONVITZ, FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS: HISTORY OF A CONSTITUTIONAL DOCTRINE 
1-2 (2001) (illustrating that the role of the courts in constitutional disputes is to balance the conflict 
between fundamental rights); Bernhard Schlink, The Dynamics of Constitutional Adjudication, 17 
CARDOZO L. REV. 1231, 1234 (1996) (describing the role of constitutional adjudication as mediating the 
conflict between fundamental rights); see also Matthew Adler, Law and Incommensurability: 
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Investment treaties and, particularly, their NPM provisions,43 offer states 
a range of defenses that require tribunals to weigh primary values, adjudicate 
fundamental rights, and take into account basic social and cultural policies. 
These defenses allow, for example, actions necessary to protect “public 
morals” or “public health,” or to respond to states of emergency.44 Beyond the 
Argentine cases, it is easy to imagine similar defenses in investment treaty 
arbitration. Take, for example, a hypothetical claim by a German company 
that had invested in Pakistan under the Germany-Pakistan BIT, 45  which 
contains a “public health or morality” NPM provision, precluding liability for 
state actions necessary to protect public morals. Assume further that the 
German company had invested in a factory manufacturing leather goods used 
for erotic purposes by European consumers.46 Should Pakistan then enact a 
regulation banning the production of such goods on grounds that they violate 
public morals, an arbitral tribunal would have to determine the meaning and 
scope of “public morality” based on an interpretation of the term contained in 
the NPM clause of the Germany-Pakistan BIT. The rights of German investors 
and the protection of Pakistani public morals would be in direct conflict. The 
ability of Pakistan to regulate on the basis of prevailing religious and moral 
views would be at stake. 
Similar public law or even quasi-constitutional disputes have already 
become relatively common within the framework of the WTO based on the 
exceptions contained in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 47 
(GATT) and the General Agreement on Trade in Services48 (GATS). In the 
case of Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services,49 the United 
States raised a defense under Articles XIV(a) and XIV(c) of the GATS, 
asserting that the regulations restricting internet gambling were “necessary to 
protect public morals.”50 The WTO panel found that the U.S. actions were 
neither necessary to protect public morals nor consistent with the chapeau of 
Article XIV of the GATS. Thereafter, the Appellate Body reversed in part, 
                                                                                                                                                                         
Introduction, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 1169, 1169-70 (1998) (commenting on the challenges encountered in 
the conflict between fundamental rights); Eric. A. Posner, The Strategic Basis of Principled Behavior: A 
Critique of the Incommensurability Thesis, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 1185, 1185-86 (1998) (critiquing the 
theory of incommensurability when adjudicating between fundamental rights); Laurence H. Tribe, Ten 
Lessons Our Constitutional Experience Can Teach Us About the Puzzle of Animal Rights: The Work of 
Steven M. Wise, 7 ANIMAL L. 1 (2001) (stating that fundamental rights of nonhuman beings and the 
rights of human beings often come into conflict and require adjudication within the framework of 
constitutional law). 
43. See generally Burke-White & von Staden, supra note 36, at 318-26. 
44. For concrete examples, see Burke-White & von Staden, supra note 36, at 332-35. 
45. Treaty for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, F.R.G.-Pak., Protocol, ¶ 2, Nov. 
25, 1959, 457 U.N.T.S. 24. 
46. This hypothetical is grounded in the reality of a Pakistani business involved in the 
production of such goods and facing pressures for reasons of public morality. See Adam B. Ellick, Lacy 
Threads and Leather Straps Bind a Business, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 28, 2009, at A8. 
47. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade arts. XX, XXI, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55 
U.N.T.S 187 [hereinafter GATT]. 
48. General Agreement on Trade in Services arts. XIV, XIVbis, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh 
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1B, Legal Instruments—Results of the 
Uruguay Round, 1869 U.N.T.S. 183, 33 I.L.M. 1144, 1168 (1994). 
49. Panel Report, United States—Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling 
and Betting Services, WT/DS285/R (Nov. 10, 2004).  
50.   Id. ¶ 114. 
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finding that the U.S. regulations were “necessary to protect public morals” but 
affirmed the panel’s determination that the measures were inconsistent with 
the chapeau.51 Again, the dispute turned on the scope of the state’s right to 
regulate and give expression to prevailing public morals, an issue central to 
definitions of national identity and contrasting quasi-constitutional values.52  
While a growing number of international arbitrations raise issues of 
public law concern, not all disputes and not all elements of any given dispute 
fall into this public law category. In order for international arbitral tribunals to 
develop alternate standards of review that are more appropriate in the public 
law context, it is necessary to clarify the types of disputes and issues that 
ought to be treated as part of public law and to which our argument for 
alternative standards of review therefore applies. Two classes of such disputes 
can be identified: first, those of a merely regulatory or administrative 
character which merit public law standards of review and, second, a subset of 
these disputes, which we term quasi-constitutional, in which an even stronger 
argument for alternative standards of review can be made.  
In both the regulatory/administrative and quasi-constitutional sets of 
disputes, there are two independent, but cumulative elements for determining 
that public law standards of review are appropriate: subject matter and text. 
First, the subject matter of these disputes must be clearly of a public law 
nature. Second, the particular provision of the BIT being invoked either by the 
claimant or respondent must include trigger language indicating that states 
sought to maintain some freedom of action to regulate in these circumstances 
and that, as a matter of formal treaty interpretation, public law standards of 
review are appropriate. The cumulative nature of these two elements ensures 
that public law standards of review are, in fact, appropriate, and it safeguards 
against states merely claiming that a dispute is part of the public law so as to 
benefit from a more deferential standard of review. 
The first element of this analysis is satisfied in any arbitration whose 
subject matter is essentially part of public law.53 By public law, here, we refer 
to arbitrations for which, in the words of Abram Chayes, “the subject matter 
of the lawsuit is not a dispute between private individuals about private rights, 
                                                                                                                                                                         
51. Appellate Body Report, United States—Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of 
Gambling and Betting Services, WT/DS285/AB/R (Apr. 7, 2005) [hereinafter US—Gambling]. 
52. For another recent case hinging on the GATT’s public morals exception, see Appellate 
Body Report, China—Measures Affecting Trading Rights and Distribution Services for Certain 
Publications and Audiovisual Entertainment Products, WT/DS363/AB/R (Jan. 19, 2010). 
53. Martin Shapiro describes public law as governing “the internal processes of government 
bodies and their relations to one another and to the citizens.” Martin Shapiro, Public Law and Judicial 
Politics, in 2 POLITICAL SCIENCE: THE STATE OF THE DISCIPLINE 365, 366 (Ada W. Finifter ed., 1993). 
Jack Goldsmith and Daryl Levinson suggest that international law and public law share much in 
common. See Jack Goldsmith & Daryl Levinson, Law for States: International Law, Constitutional Law, 
Public Law, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1791, 1795 (2009) (describing both international law and public law as 
sharing the “distinctive aspiration of public law regimes to constitute and constrain the behavior of state 
institutions and the distinctive difficulty these regimes face of not being able to rely fully on these same 
state institutions for implementation and enforcement”). U.S. courts have already made fundamental 
transitions from private law to public law reasoning. See Cass R. Sunstein, Standing and the 
Privatization of Public Law, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1432, 1432 (1988) (“Not until the 1960s did courts, in 
concert with Congress, begin to develop an independent public law—a set of principles that owed their 
origin not only to traditional private law, but also to the ideas that gave rise to administrative regulation 
in the first place.”). 
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but a grievance about the operation of public policy.”54 These are essentially 
the types of disputes that Van Harten has rightly recognized as the new 
direction of ICSID, in which arbitral tribunals “review and control the 
exercise of public authority.”55  
These public law disputes juxtapose two basic sets of rights that cannot 
be easily reconciled. On one side of this conflict of rights are investors who 
are entitled pursuant to a BIT to, for example, fair and equitable treatment.56 
On the other side is the state, which has a right to achieve permissible policy 
aims as specified in a BIT. In the Argentine cases, for example, U.S. investors 
had rights to fair and equitable treatment that were incompatible with the 
state’s right to protect its essential security and public order. This is a classic 
public law tension. Such disputes are now relatively frequent in investor-state 
arbitrations and include not just the NPM-type defenses raised by Argentina, 
but also a range of cases in which investors challenge basic regulatory 
activities of the host state as well as actions undertaken by the state to provide 
public services.57 
An even stronger case for alternative standards of review derived from 
comparative public law arises in a subset of these public law disputes 
involving what we have termed quasi-constitutional adjudication. These 
disputes implicate changes to a state’s economic and social constitution, 
which have wide ranging ramifications. These are cases in which a state’s 
essential interests are at stake and in which the result of the litigation will 
impact the social and economic life of the state. Again in Abram Chayes’s 
words, this type of litigation will have “important consequences for  
many persons including absentees.” 58  In the Argentine cases those policy 
ramifications are readily apparent. At stake was nothing short of Argentina’s 
ability to recover after a catastrophic economic collapse, its ability to prevent 
public unrest and riots, and the fundamental structure of its economy. 
Similarly, in the hypothetical German investment in Pakistan, the arbitration 
would impact publicly espoused fundamental national values. In this narrower 
subset of cases, arbitral awards may even have implications for the formal 
constitutional rights of a respondent state’s citizens.59 In these cases, the need 
for public law standards of review is even more urgent as arbitral tribunals are 
transformed into public law, quasi-constitutional adjudicators. 
                                                                                                                                                                         
54. See Chayes, supra note 7, at 1302.  
55. VAN HARTEN, supra note 17, at 70. 
56. See, e.g., U.S.-Argentina BIT, supra note 37, art. II, ¶ 2.  
57. See, for example, Biwater Gauff (Tanzania) Ltd. v. United Republic of Tanzania, ICSID 
Case No. ARB/05/22, Award (July 24, 2008), http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?request 
Type=CasesRH&actionVal=showDoc&docId=DC770_En&caseId=C67, which concerned a dispute 
over the provision of water and sewage services—arguably a basic public good to be provided in the last 
instance by the state—in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. For a discussion of the case, see Luke Eric Peterson, 
In-Depth: Tanzania’s Handling of City Water Deemed an Expropriation; Tribunal Finds Project Was 
Worthless by Time of Expropriation, 1 Investment Arbitration Reporter 5 (2008), 
http://www.iareporter.com/Archive/IAR-07-28-08.pdf. See also Kaushal, supra note 26, at 530.  
58. Chayes, supra note 7, at 1302. These interests are often referred to as essential interests in 
public international law. See U.N. Int’l Law Comm’n, Draft Articles on the Responsibility of States for 
Internationally Wrongful Acts with Commentaries, Reprinted in Report of the International Law 
Commission, at 201-02, U.N. Doc. A/56/10 (2001) [hereinafter ILC Draft Articles on State 
Responsibility]. 
59. Schlink, supra note 42, at 1-2; Tribe, supra note 42, at 1-3.    
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In both the broader set of public law adjudications and the narrower 
group of quasi-constitutional disputes, the subject of the arbitration is firmly 
part of public law, that is, “[t]he body of law dealing with the relations 
between private individuals and the government, and with the structure of the 
government itself; constitutional law, criminal law, and administrative law 
taken together.”60 As demonstrated by the examples above, even though these 
cases are heard in the context of private arbitrations, the public law nature of 
the substantive claims and defenses merits the application of public law 
standards of review. 
 A second cumulative element for determining that public law standards 
of review are appropriate is that the text of the treaty being interpreted by the 
arbitral tribunal must include appropriate trigger language. In many of these 
cases, the formal rules of treaty interpretation applied to specific textual 
provisions of the BIT directly raised in the arbitration dictate a shift in the 
nature of a tribunal’s review. For example, where a state’s defense is based on 
an NPM clause in a BIT, the “necessary for” term suggests an element of 
subjectivity that ought to lead, as a matter of formal treaty interpretation, to a 
more deferential review. 61  In the case of the NPM clause in the U.S.-
Argentina BIT, the trigger language that signals the need for a shift in the 
standard of review is two-fold.62 First, the clause sets out three permissible 
objectives—public order, international peace or security, and essential 
security—that the state may legitimately pursue. These permissible objectives 
are, to a degree, self-referential and subjective. Second, the nexus 
requirement, in this case “necessary for,” signals to arbitrators that a balancing 
process is required in which the state’s interest must be weighed against that 
of investors.  
Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties requires that 
the treaty terms be interpreted according to the “ordinary meaning to be given 
to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and 
purpose.”63 The most appropriate and, in this sense “ordinary,” meaning of 
“necessary” requires a balancing between the state’s objectives and the rights 
of investors. 64  Public law adjudication, both in domestic courts and 
international tribunals, has developed a somewhat varied jurisprudence with 
respect to the interpretation of the word “necessary.” 65  Yet courts and 
tribunals more or less uniformly recognize that the interpretation and 
application of “necessary” requires a balancing of rights,66 which, in turn, 
                                                                                                                                                                         
60. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1350-51 (9th ed. 2009).  
61. See Yuval Shany, Toward a General Margin of Appreciation Doctrine in International 
Law, 16 EUR. J. INT’L L. 907, 913 (2006) (arguing that deference is appropriate where “the application 
of law is inherently or inevitably uncertain”). 
62. U.S.-Argentina BIT, supra note 37, art. XI. For other examples of NPM clauses, see 
Burke-White & von Staden, supra note 36, at 318-26. 
63. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 8 
I.L.M. 679. 
64. For discussions of interpretations of “necessary” in this context, see infra Part III. 
65. See infra Part III for a review of these standards. 
66. See, e.g., Burke-White & von Staden, supra note 36; Alec Stone Sweet, Investor-State 
Arbitration: Proportionality’s New Frontier, 4 LAW & LEGAL ETHICS OF HUM. RTS. (forthcoming 2010) 
(manuscript at 23, on file with authors). 
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requires a standard of review derived from public law that weighs competing 
rights and interests.  
Beyond the ordinary meaning of “necessary,” Article 31 of the Vienna 
Convention points to the context of the term,67 which, in the case of an NPM 
clause, is that of a general exception to the treaty based on the nexus between 
state action and a set of permissible objectives. Such a general exception 
indicates that the term is intended to provide states with some flexibility in 
achieving those objectives based on their own public interests. Context thus 
also justifies the application of a more relaxed, public law standard of review 
in the application of NPM clauses pursuant to the formal rules of treaty 
interpretation.68 
Even if “necessary” is viewed by a tribunal as ambiguous, Article 32 of 
the Vienna Convention points an interpreter to the travaux préparatoires of 
the treaty.69 While the drafting history of each treaty is unique, at least in the 
case of the U.S. BIT program, evidence strongly suggests that the United 
States and its treaty partners understood the term to give states considerable 
flexibility in responding to exceptional situations. According to a Senate 
report attached to the 1988 U.S. Model BIT, for example, “[u]nder Article X 
of the treaty, either Party may take all measures necessary to deal with any 
unusual and extraordinary threat to its national security.”70 The flexibility that 
many states have sought to preserve for themselves through NPM clauses can 
only be realized through the application of more deferential, public law 
standards of review that recognize the conflict of rights inherent in the public 
law context of the dispute. 
This two-part test for determining when public law standards of review 
are applicable is restrictive so as to prevent states from seeking more 
deferential review where it is not appropriate. An overly broad reading of the 
cases in which such review should be applied could, admittedly, undercut the 
international investment law regime by tilting arbitral outcomes in favor of 
states. However, where the subject matter of a dispute or part thereof is within 
the realm of public law and the text of the treaty being invoked in the 
arbitration justifies—within the permissible grounds of interpretation under 
the Vienna Convention—a greater degree of deference to national regulatory 
authorities, ad hoc arbitral tribunals ought to apply standards of review more 
appropriate to the public law nature of such disputes. While the number of 
such disputes is limited, it is also increasing and likely to continue to expand 
given the new issues being presented in investment arbitrations. Yet ICSID 
tribunals themselves have not recognized and responded to the changing 
nature of their caseload. 
                                                                                                                                                                         
67. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 63, art. 31. 
68. See generally Burke-White & von Staden, supra note 36 (offering a detailed analysis of 
the U.S.-Argentina BIT, including its context).  
69. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 63, art. 32. 
70. See S. EXEC. REP. NO. 100-32, at 9-11 (1988). For a more detailed analysis, see Burke-
White & von Staden, supra note 36, at 376-80. 
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III. THE ICSID APPROACH, A GROWING LEGITIMACY GAP, AND THE NEED 
FOR NEW STANDARDS OF REVIEW IN INVESTMENT ARBITRATION 
Despite the growing number of arbitrations that have clear public law 
elements, ICSID tribunals have, as yet, failed to develop a coherent 
jurisprudential approach or consistent standard of review. Instead, ICSID 
arbitrations have generated a contradictory jurisprudence that lacks theoretical 
coherence and remains tied to the private law origins of international 
arbitration. The Argentine cases are illustrative of the problematic 
jurisprudence to date. Those cases can be understood in two categories: the 
early jurisprudence, consisting of the first three awards against Argentina 
under the U.S.-Argentina BIT, and the more recent cases, including two more 
recent awards under the BIT.  
 The ICSID tribunals in the first three Argentine cases—CMS Gas 
Transmission Company v. Argentine Republic71 (CMS), Enron v. Argentine 
Republic 72  (Enron), and Sempra v. Argentine Republic 73  (Sempra)—all 
applied an extraordinarily strict standard when reviewing Argentina’s 
economic responses to the financial crisis. That standard essentially made 
Argentina’s invocation of the NPM clause in the U.S.-Argentina BIT a legal 
impossibility and failed to take into consideration the broader policy context 
in which the arbitrations arose. Rather than recognize the public law nature of 
the arbitration and Argentina’s treaty-based defenses, these three tribunals 
operated as if the only rights at stake were those of investors and as if the 
tribunals were enforcing narrowly drawn private law contracts divorced from 
public law context.74 
In approaching the NPM clause in the U.S.-Argentina BIT, the three 
tribunals in CMS, Enron, and Sempra imported the customary law 
requirements of necessity into their analysis and required Argentina to show 
that the actions it took were the only ones available to the government to 
respond to the crisis.75 Admittedly, this standard derives from a source in 
international public law—the necessity defense in customary law. Yet the 
necessity defense is not a standard of review, but rather a narrow carve-out of 
                                                                                                                                                                         
71. CMS Gas Transmission Co. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8, Award 
(May 12, 2005), http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal= 
showDoc&docId=DC687_En&caseId=C4. 
72. Enron Corp. Ponderosa Assets, L.P. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/3, 
Award (May 22, 2007), http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/Enron-Award.pdf. 
73. Sempra Energy Int’l v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/16, Award (Sept. 
28, 2007), http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=showDoc 
&docId=DC694_En&caseId=C8. 
74. In contract disputes, the goal of an adjudicator is to give effect to the intent of the parties, 
which generally results in a narrow interpretation of the text independent from broader policy concerns. 
See SAMUEL WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 32:1 (1998) (“Consistent with the 
notion that a contract represents the parties’ own private agreement as to their legal relationship, 
liabilities, and rights, the primary purpose and function of the court in interpreting a contract is to 
ascertain the parties’ intention so as to give effect to that intention.”); Siegel Transfer, Inc. v. Carrier 
Express, Inc., 54 F.3d 1125, 1139 (3d Cir. 1995) (“The cardinal rule in contract interpretation is that 
effect must be given to the intention of the parties . . . .”). 
75. Sempra, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/16, Award, ¶¶ 350-351. This approach fails to give the 
government any policy flexibility and does not recognize that some policy options may be more or less 
effective in responding to the crisis. 
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general customary law rules of state responsibility.76 It does not, therefore, lay 
the groundwork for a standard of review that could be generalized to public 
law disputes writ large. Moreover, the necessity defense is extraordinarily 
narrowly defined and by intent almost impossible to satisfy. In applying the 
NPM clause, these three tribunals looked to Article 25(1)(a) of the Draft 
Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, 
according to which the necessity defense is only available if the actions taken 
by the state were “the only way for the State to safeguard an essential interest 
against a grave and imminent peril.”77 The ILC Commentaries to the Draft 
Articles provide that “[t]he plea is excluded if there are other (otherwise 
lawful) means available, even if they may be more costly or less 
convenient.”78 
The reliance on and narrow construction of the customary international 
law necessity defense essentially preclude the public law elements of the 
dispute based on the NPM clause from playing any meaningful role in the 
resolution of the case. The CMS tribunal, for example, found that the ILC’s 
comment “that the plea of necessity is ‘excluded if there are other (otherwise 
lawful) means available, even if they may be more costly or less convenient,’ 
is persuasive in assisting this tribunal in concluding that the measures adopted 
were not the only steps available.”79 Similarly, the Enron tribunal noted that 
“[a] rather sad world comparative experience in the handling of economic 
crises, shows that there are always many approaches to address and correct 
such critical events, and it is difficult to justify that none of them were 
available in the Argentine case.”80 The three tribunals asserted that if any 
alternative policy choice is available—regardless of its likely effectiveness—
the necessity defense and, by implication, the NPM defense under Article XI 
of the treaty, is unavailable. Since states always face a range of policy choices 
in response to any issue, whichever policy a state chooses is, by definition, not 
the only available response to the crisis. The three tribunals thus gave no 
deference whatsoever to Argentina’s policy choices and, essentially, vitiated 
the necessity defense as a matter of law. The tribunals thereby reverted back 
to what is essentially a private law, contractual dispute model, without 
recognition of the public law, quasi-constitutional elements that in fact lay at 
the heart of the cases. 
In contrast, two other tribunals that reviewed Argentina’s actions under 
the U.S.-Argentina BIT—LG&E v. Argentine Republic 81  (LG&E) and 
                                                                                                                                                                         
76. ILC Draft Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 58, art. 25, ¶ 1 (defining necessity 
as a circumstance “precluding wrongfulness”). 
77. Id. art. 25, ¶ 1. 
78. Id. art. 25, ¶ 15. 
79. CMS Gas Transmission Co. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8, Award, ¶ 
324 (May 12, 2005), http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal 
=showDoc&docId=DC687_En&caseId=C4. 
80. Enron Corp. Ponderosa Assets, L.P. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/3, 
Award, ¶ 308 (May 22, 2007), http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/Enron-Award.pdf; see also Sempra, 
ICSID Case No. ARB/02/16, Award, ¶ 350 (providing a word-for-word identical discussion as the CMS 
tribunal). 
81. LG&E Energy Corp. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/1, Decision on 
Liability (Oct. 3, 2006), http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&action 
Val=showDoc&docId=DC627_En&caseId=C208. 
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Continental Casualty v. Argentine Republic82 (Continental Casualty)—took a 
very different approach to the NPM clause, and gave considerable deference 
to Argentina’s determination that its actions were necessary to protect 
essential security interests and maintain public order. These tribunals 
recognized the public law nature of the disputes and the fact that, along with 
the rights of investors, considerable national and global policy concerns were 
at stake. While these two tribunals, and particularly the Continental Casualty 
tribunal, began the process of developing appropriate standards of review for 
such disputes—based both on proportionality analysis and the margin of 
appreciation—the jurisprudential framework remains thin and the applicable 
standards of review are far from sufficiently elaborated and clarified. 
At best, ICSID tribunals reviewing Argentina’s actions have generated 
inconsistent and incoherent jurisprudence. At worst, the early cases against 
Argentina suggest at least a narrow private law approach to public law dispute 
settlement based on a “no other means available” test that ignores public law 
context. These contradictory awards and the lack of a coherent or consistent 
standard of review are especially problematic given that the ICSID 
Convention lacks meaningful appellate review and makes awards essentially 
unreviewable by national courts and enforceable as if they were domestic 
judgments of the contracting state in which enforcement is sought.83 As a 
result, when ICSID tribunals get it wrong, neither states nor investors have 
any meaningful recourse and there is no readily available means for an 
appellate body to reconcile contradictory jurisprudence.  
The divergent decisions in these cases, their often strained legal 
reasoning, and the exceptional sums awarded to claimants against Argentina 
have called into question, at least in the eyes of some states, the legitimacy of 
the ICSID system. 84  Senior officials in the Argentine government have 
pondered the political viability of paying more than one hundred thirty million 
dollars on an award that an annulment committee has found to be legally 
flawed.85 Other states have taken even bolder steps.86 In May 2007, Bolivian 
President Evo Morales withdrew Bolivia from the ICSID Convention, noting 
that “[we] emphatically reject the legal, media and diplomatic pressure of 
some multinationals that . . . resist the sovereign rulings of countries, making 
threats and initiating suits in international arbitration.”87 On July 9, 2009, 
                                                                                                                                                                         
82. Cont’l Cas. Co. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/9, Award (Sept. 5, 
2008), http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/ContinentalCasualtyAward.pdf. 
83. ICSID Convention, supra note 2, arts. 53-55. 
84. The question of the legitimacy of the ICSID system should not in any way be interpreted 
as suggesting that already final awards against states should not be paid. Legitimacy refers here to the 
justification and acceptability of political authority, see Bodansky, supra note 8, at 310, and is thus 
separate from formal legal authority. Regardless of whether states question the legitimacy of the system, 
and except to the extent that they are annulled in conformity with Article 52 of the ICSID Convention, 
such awards are still legally valid and binding under Article 53 of the latter. See ICSID Convention, 
supra note 2, art. 53, ¶ 1. On the relationship of legitimacy and legality, albeit in a different context, see, 
for example, Tanja Voon, Closing the Gap Between Legitimacy and Legality of Humanitarian 
Intervention: Lessons from East Timor and Kosovo, 7 UCLA J. INT’L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 31, 58-63 
(2002). 
85. Osvaldo Guglielmino, Prosecutor of the Treasury of the Argentine Republic, Address at 
American University, Washington College of Law (Oct. 24, 2007). 
86. See Kaushal, supra note 26, at 493. 
87. Damon Vis-Dunbar, Luke Eric Peterson & Fernando Cabrera Diaz, Bolivia Notifies World 
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Ecuadorian President Rafael Correa denounced the ICSID Convention, 
removing the country from future ICSID jurisdiction.88 Other Latin American 
states such as Venezuela and Nicaragua have likewise noted their desire to 
limit ICSID jurisdiction and threatened to withdraw from the ICSID 
Convention, without, however, following through on these threats so far.89 
Even if these states are considered outliers, led by left-leaning governments, 
their expressed skepticism is nonetheless troubling for the future of ICSID. 
In addition, the perceived legitimacy of investment treaty arbitration has 
been questioned from within the ICSID system.90  In CMS, an annulment 
committee constituted under Article 52 of the ICSID Convention and 
comprised of three of the world’s leading international lawyers91 took the 
unusual step of finding that, while it lacked jurisdiction to overturn the award, 
the legal reasoning used by the arbitrators was problematic. Specifically, the 
committee found that the tribunal “gave an erroneous interpretation of Article 
XI” that “could have had a decisive impact on the operative part of the 
award.” 92  This bold pronouncement, which reaches well beyond the 
committee’s limited jurisdiction, casts a shadow of doubt over both the quality 
of ICSID jurisprudence and the legitimacy of investor-state arbitration more 
generally.93 
In response to the growing perception of a legitimacy deficit in the 
ICSID system and the threat of state withdrawals from the Convention, 
commentators have suggested a range of reforms.94 Perhaps most prominent 
has been the call for the creation of a standing appellate mechanism with 
jurisdiction to review errors of law, rather than the far narrower grounds for 
annulment presently available under Article 52 of the Convention.95 Even the 
                                                                                                                                                                         
Bank of Withdrawal from ICSID, Pursues BIT Revisions, International Institute for Sustainable 
Development, INVESTMENT TREATY NEWS, May 7, 2007, http://www.bilaterals.org/article.php3?id_ 
article=8221. 
88. See New Release, ICSID, Ecuador Submits Notice Under Article 71 of the ICSID 
Convention (July 9, 2009), http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH& 
actionVal=OpenPage&PageType=AnnouncementsFrame&pageName=Announcement20. 
89. See Treaty Developments Related to Bolivia, Ecuador, and Venezuela, WHITE & CASE 
INT’L DISPUTES Q. (White & Case, New York, N.Y.), Fall 2007, at 5, available at 
http://www.whitecase.com/idq/fall_2007/ia1; see also Memorandum, Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & 
Flom, Nicaragua Threatens Withdrawal from ICSID: Implications for Investors (Apr. 24, 2008), 
http://www.skadden.com/content%5CPublications%5CPublications1391_0.pdf. 
90. Again, such statements questioning the legitimacy of the system do not provide legal 
grounds for challenging properly rendered awards. See supra note 84. 
91. Gilbert Guillaume was the President of the International Court of Justice, Nabil Elaraby 
was a member of that court, and James Crawford is the Whewell Professor of International Law at 
Cambridge University and the Rapporteur of the International Law Commission for the Draft Articles on 
the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts. See CMS Gas Transmission Co. v. 
Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/08, Decision on Annulment, ¶¶ 95, 96-97, 125, 136, 146, 
158 (Sept. 25, 2007), http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal 
=showDoc&docId=DC687_En&caseId=C4. 
92. Id. ¶ 135. 
93. For a more detailed discussion of this problematic jurisprudence, see William Burke-
White, The Argentine Financial Crisis: State Liability Under BITs and the Legitimacy of the ICSID 
System, 3 ASIAN J. WTO & INT’L HEALTH L. & POL’Y 199 (2008). 
94. See, e.g., Choudhury, supra note 13, at 807-30 (offering suggestions ranging from greater 
public access to ICSID arbitrations to the involvement of amicus curie).  
95. See ELIHU LAUTERPACHT, ASPECTS OF THE ADMINISTRATION OF INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE 
112 (1991) (suggesting that arbitration could be enhanced via the use of an appellate system); Nigel 
Blackaby, Public Interest and Investment Treaty Arbitration, in INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL 
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CMS annulment committee seemed to suggest the possibility of establishing 
such appellate review, noting that “if the Committee was acting as a court of 
appeal, it would have to reconsider the Award on this ground.”96 Yet an 
appellate mechanism is not without its own problems. However constructed, 
an appellate process would be expensive and time consuming, undermining 
laudable advances of international arbitration, such as finality, efficiency, and 
speed. 
While ICSID’s critics are correct that the Argentine cases reveal an 
emerging perception of a legitimacy gap and that the current trajectory of 
ICSID jurisprudence is likely unsustainable, we suggest that the development 
of new standards of review grounded in comparative public law, rather than in 
private contract law, can imbue ICSID with enhanced legitimacy and result in 
procedures and outcomes broadly acceptable to all stakeholders without 
sacrificing the considerable benefits offered by international arbitration. 
Specifically, while ICSID tribunals have demonstrated a preference for strict 
substantive review of state behavior rooted in private contract law, those 
standards are not compatible with the new public law and, occasionally, even 
quasi-constitutional role ICSID arbitrations have come to play.97 In contrast 
with private contract law standards of review, a public law approach provides 
far more space for balancing treaty obligations with public policy interests.98 
ICSID tribunals need to rethink the standards of review applied in such 
circumstances from a comparative public law perspective.99  
                                                                                                                                                                         
ARBITRATION: IMPORTANT CONTEMPORARY QUESTIONS 355, 364 (Albert Jan van den Berg ed., 2002) 
(voicing a concern for the lack of appellate review in the investor-state arbitration context); David D. 
Caron, Reputation and Reality in the ICSID Annulment Process: Understanding the Distinction Between 
Annulment and Appeal, 7 ICSID REV.—FOREIGN INV. L.J. 21, 48-49 (1992) (narrating the concerns of a 
general counsel of a major corporation upon an adverse ruling in arbitration where there was no recourse 
to appeal); Susan D. Franck, The Legitimacy Crisis in Investment Treaty Arbitration: Privatizing Public 
International Law Through Inconsistent Decisions, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1521, 1606-10 (2005) 
(detailing the current legitimacy crisis within the ICSID system and outlining suggestions as to how to 
best remedy this crisis); ICSID, POSSIBLE IMPROVEMENTS OF THE FRAMEWORK FOR ICSID ARBITRATION 
3-4 (Oct. 22, 2004), http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=ICSIDPublicationsRH 
&actionVal=ViewAnnouncePDF&AnnouncementType=archive&AnnounceNo=22_1.pdf (discussing 
potential improvements to the ICSID system by adding an appellate review mechanism). 
96. CMS Gas Transmission Co. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8, Award, 
¶ 136 (May 12, 2005), http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&action 
Val=showDoc&docId=DC687_En&caseId=C4. 
97. Abram Chayes defines such private law disputes in part by the fact that they are “self-
contained” and that the “impact of the judgment is confined to the parties.” Chayes, supra note 7, at 
1283. 
98. For an indication of the extremely narrow construction of public policy in contract 
disputes, see, for example, Westvaco Corp. v. United Paperworkers International Union, 171 F.3d 971, 
978 (4th Cir. 1999), which said that “we emphasize, as a simple matter of judicial restraint, our 
reluctance to invoke broad nostrums of public policy to void private bargains”; and Allied Erecting & 
Dismantling Co. v. USX Corp., 249 F.3d 191, 197 (3d Cir. 2001), which said that “[w]hen ruling on the 
grounds of public policy, a court must speak for a virtual unanimity that can be found in definite 
indications in the law.” 
99. As early as 1976, Abram Chayes called for a similar change in the approach of U.S. 
judges as they were forced to adjudicate new kinds of public law disputes. See Chayes, supra note 7. 
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IV. A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF STANDARDS OF REVIEW IN  
PUBLIC LAW ADJUDICATION 
Courts and tribunals have developed a wide range of standards of review 
in public law adjudication that could serve as models for the development of a 
coherent jurisprudential approach in the ICSID context. A review of these 
existing standards used by both international and domestic courts helps situate 
the approach of ICSID tribunals to date and the range of possible standards 
ICSID tribunals could adopt. Likewise, it demonstrates that both domestic and 
international tribunals have developed mechanisms to calibrate the standard of 
review they apply to the subject matter of the dispute and the nature of the 
tribunal. This comparative analysis provides a strong foundation for our 
broader argument that a more deferential standard of review is fully 
appropriate in the circumstances of investor-state arbitral tribunals engaging 
in public law adjudication. 
This Part begins by considering existing standards used by other 
international tribunals in broadly similar contexts, including the least 
restrictive alternative standard used by the WTO and some more recent ICSID 
tribunals, the margin of appreciation as developed by the European Court of 
Human Rights and, specifically, as applied in property disputes under 
Additional Protocol I to that Convention, and good faith review. This Part 
then turns to an examination of domestic law standards of review in both the 
United States and Germany, two jurisdictions with well-developed yet distinct 
jurisprudential approaches.  
A. Standards of Review in International Adjudication 
Viewing investor-state arbitrations that contain public law issues in the 
context of comparative public law informs and shifts the range of available 
standards that a tribunal might apply when reviewing state actions and, 
particularly, the application of defenses such as NPM clauses that raise quasi-
constitutional concerns. This Section examines the range of possible standards 
that ICSID tribunals could adopt based on the jurisprudence of other 
international courts, including the WTO and the ECtHR. The Section first 
considers the least restrictive alternative standard, and then examines both the 
margin of appreciation and good faith review. 
1. The WTO and Later ICSID Jurisprudence: The Least 
Restrictive Alternative  
A first approach to reviewing state behavior in public law disputes 
derives from the jurisprudence of GATT and WTO panels.100 Articles XX and 
XXI of the GATT provide states with defenses very similar to those found in 
the NPM clauses of various BITs. Specifically, GATT Article XX allows 
states to take measures consistent with the chapeau that are, for example, 
                                                                                                                                                                         
100. See Susan Rose-Ackerman & Benjamin Billa, Treaties and National Security, 40 N.Y.U. 
J. INT’L L. & POL. 437, 462-68 (2008) (discussing five GATT disputes that “have begun to establish a 
framework for [Article XXI’s] interpretation”). 
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“necessary to protect public morals” or “necessary to protect human, animal 
or plant life or health.”101 Similarly, Article XXI provides that nothing in the 
GATT agreement “shall be construed . . . to prevent any contracting party 
from taking any action which it considers necessary for the protection of its 
essential security interests . . . .”102 In addressing these exceptions, GATT and 
WTO panels have developed a relatively consistent jurisprudence that asks 
whether the state has taken the least restrictive measure reasonably available 
that meets its permissible objective under GATT Articles XX or XXI.103 In 
contrast to the only means available test used by the first set of ICSID 
tribunals to render awards against Argentina, this least restrictive alternative 
test is a public law approach that attempts to balance the otherwise 
irreconcilable rights of the parties.104 
The roots of this approach are evident in the 1990 Thailand Cigarettes 
GATT dispute. In that case, Thailand banned foreign-produced cigarettes but 
allowed the sale of domestically produced cigarettes, justifying the measure 
based on Article XX(d) of GATT on the grounds that such restrictions were 
“necessary to protect human health.”105 The GATT panel disagreed, finding 
that the import restrictions imposed by Thailand could be considered 
“necessary” in terms of Article XX(b) only if there were “no alternative 
measure consistent with the General Agreement, or less inconsistent with it, 
which Thailand could reasonably be expected to employ to achieve its health 
policy objectives.” 106  In other words, Thailand’s actions could only be 
justified if they were the least restrictive means of achieving the legitimate 
policy objective. In this case, a ban on all foreign cigarettes was not the least 
restrictive means available to protect public health and was deemed a breach 
of GATT obligations.  
Seven years later a GATT panel in United States—Section 337 of the 
Tariff Act of 1930 expounded on the interpretation of “necessary” in the 
context of Article XX. In so doing, the Panel reaffirmed the least restrictive 
alternative test:  
                                                                                                                                                                         
101. GATT, supra note 47, art. XX (a)-(b).  
102. Id. art. XXI(b). For discussion, see Dapo Akande & Sope Williams, International 
Adjudication on National Security Issues: What Role for the WTO?, 43 VA. J. INT’L L. 365, 390-91 
(2003), suggesting an interpretation of Article XXI that incorporates the principle of abus de droit, a 
concept that refers to a state exercising a right either in a way which impedes the enjoyment by other 
states of their own rights or for an end different from that for which the right was created, to the injury 
of another state. 
103. For a general discussion of the least restrictive means test, see Alan O. Sykes, The Least 
Restrictive Means, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 403, 416 (2003), noting that “if the regulatory objective relates to 
some highly valued interest such as the protection of human life, then the challenged regulation will be 
upheld if there is any doubt as to the ability of the proposed alternative to achieve the same level of 
efficacy.” 
104. For discussion of the WTO’s approach to balancing and, particularly, its use of 
proportionality analysis, see Mads Andenas & Stefan Zleptnig, Proportionality and Balancing in WTO 
Law: A Comparative Perspective, 20 CAMBRIDGE REV. INT’L AFF. 71 (2007); Andrew D. Mitchell, 
Proportionality and Remedies in WTO Disputes, 17 EUR. J. INT’L L. 985 (2006); and Thomas Sebastian, 
World Trade Organization Remedies and the Assessment of Proportionality: Equivalence and 
Appropriateness, 48 HARV. INT’L L.J. 337 (2007).  
105. Report of the Panel, Thailand—Restrictions on Importation of and Internal Taxes on 
Cigarettes, ¶ 12, DS10/R (Oct. 5, 1990), GATT B.I.S.D. (37th Supp.) at 200, 203 (1990). 
106. Id. ¶ 75, GATT B.I.S.D. (37th Supp.) at 223. 
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[A] contracting party cannot justify a measure inconsistent with another GATT provision 
as “necessary” in terms of Article XX(d) if an alternative measure which it could 
reasonably be expected to employ and which is not inconsistent with other GATT 
provisions is available to it. By the same token, in cases where a measure consistent with 
other GATT provisions is not reasonably available, a contracting party is bound to use, 
among the measures reasonably available to it, that which entails the least degree of 
inconsistency with other GATT provisions.107 
Notably, the panel stressed that the alternative measures against which the 
states’ actions are judged must truly be “reasonably available” and that states 
are not expected under Article XX to undertake fundamental transformations 
of their economic policy.108 
In practice, the least restrictive alternative approach developed by GATT 
and WTO panels operates as a three-part test. First, the panel must determine 
if the measures taken by the state are in fact designed to protect or further a 
permissible objective under the relevant treaty.109  Second, the panel must 
assess whether those measures are necessary.110 That determination, in turn, 
requires a balancing of three factors: the interests asserted by the state taking 
the actions, the “contribution of the measure to the realization of the ends 
pursued by it,” and the “restrictive impact of the measure on international 
commerce”111 (the interests of the state challenging the action). Third, the 
panel must undertake a “comparison between the challenged measure and 
possible alternatives.”112 In this third step, if the state invoking the exception 
makes a prima facie case that its measures were necessary, the burden shifts to 
the complaining state to show that another measure was reasonably available 
that would have been both less restrictive on international commerce and have 
been equally effective in achieving the state’s permissible objective.113 
2. The Margin of Appreciation 
The margin of appreciation originated at the international level in the 
context of regional human rights protection, but is now widely used in other 
contexts as well. 
a. Origins and Justification 
The margin of appreciation doctrine in transnational adjudication has 
been shaped by the jurisprudence of the ECtHR, the judicial organ set up 
                                                                                                                                                                         
107. United States—Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, ¶ 5.26, L/6439 (Jan. 16, 1989), 
GATT, B.I.S.D. (36th Supp.) at 345, 389-91 (1989) [hereinafter US—Section 337]. See also Benn 
McGrady, Necessity Exceptions in WTO Law: Retreaded Tyres, Regulatory Purpose and Cumulative 
Regulatory Measures, 12 J. INT’L ECON. L. 153 (2009), which assessed the recent decisions of the WTO 
in Panel Report, Brazil—Measures Affecting Imports of Retreaded Tyres, WT/DS332/R (June 12, 2007); 
and in Appellate Body Report, Brazil—Measures Affecting Imports of Retreaded Tyres, ¶ 198, 
WT/DS332/AB/R (Dec. 17, 2007) [hereinafter Brazil—Retreaded Tyres], especially as they pertain to 
necessity tests.   
108. US—Section 337, supra note 107. 
109. US—Gambling, supra note 51, ¶ 294. 
110. Id. 
111. Id. ¶ 306. 
112. Id. ¶ 307. 
113. Id. ¶¶ 308-310. 
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under the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).114 Making its first 
appearance in early reports of the now-abolished European Commission of 
Human Rights with respect to the interpretation and application of the 
Convention’s derogation provision, Article 15,115 it has over time assumed a 
prevalent role in the interpretation and application of a number of other 
Convention provisions as well.116  
The margin of appreciation can be defined as the “breadth of 
deference”117 that the Court is willing to grant to the decisions of national 
legislative, executive, and judicial decisionmakers. The margin is based on a 
recognition that the normative requirements articulated in the Convention text 
can often be legitimately met by a range of distinct measures that may strike 
different, but still normatively acceptable, balances between individual rights 
and governmental interests. Likewise, the margin recognizes that some 
national determinations restricting Convention rights may be necessary for the 
protection of other values and permissible objectives, such as national 
security, public order, health, or morals. Noting the subsidiary position of the 
ECHR system with respect to national systems for the protection of human 
rights, and that domestic decisionmakers are often better positioned to make 
such determinations due to “their direct and continuous contact with the vital 
forces of their countries,” the Court has invoked the margin of appreciation. In 
so doing, the Court emphasizes that it is first and foremost “for the national 
authorities to make the initial assessment of the reality of the pressing social 
need implied by the notion of ‘necessity’ in [such] context[s].”118 The Court 
then reviews such assessments by the national authorities with an eye to both 
their aims and necessity, in order to determine “whether the reasons given by 
the national authorities to justify the actual measures of ‘interference’ they 
take are relevant and sufficient.”119 As one of the Court’s judges has noted, 
The margin of appreciation . . . permits the Court to show the proper degree of respect for 
the objectives that a Contracting Party may wish to pursue, and the trade-offs that it 
wants to make . . . while at the same time preventing unnecessary restrictions on the 
fullness of the protection which the Convention can provide.120 
In the Court’s usage, the “width,” or scope, of the margin of appreciation 
is not uniform across cases and “will vary according to the context . . . . 
                                                                                                                                                                         
114. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 19, Nov. 
4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222 [hereinafter ECHR]. 
115. See Lawless v. Ireland, App. No. 332/57, Report of the Commission, 1 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. 
B) 9, 88-90 (1959) (opinion of Waldock, Berg, Faber, Crosbie & Erim, Comm’rs); id. at 97-98 (opinion 
of Süsterhenn, Comm’r); id. at 114, 130 (opinion of Waldock, Comm’r); id. at 130, 133 (opinion of 
Sörensen, Comm’r); Greece v. United Kingdom, App. No. 176/56, Report of the Commission, vol. 1, 
¶¶ 132, 143 (1958), http://www.echr.coe.int; id. vol. 2, ¶ 318. 
116. See, e.g., Ronald St. John Macdonald, The Margin of Appreciation, in THE EUROPEAN 
SYSTEM FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 83, 83 (R. St. J. Macdonald, F. Matscher & H. Petzold 
eds., 1993). 
117. Howard Charles Yourow, The Margin of Appreciation Doctrine in the Dynamics of 
European Human Rights Jurisprudence, 3 CONN. J. INT’L L. 111, 118 (1987). 
118. Handyside v. United Kingdom, 24 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), ¶ 48 (1976). 
119. Id. ¶ 50. 
120. Ronald St. John Macdonald, The Margin of Appreciation in the Jurisprudence of the 
European Court of Human Rights, in 1 COLLECTED COURSES OF THE ACADEMY OF EUROPEAN LAW 95, 
160 (Andrew Clapham & Frank Emmert eds., 1992). 
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Relevant factors include the nature of the Convention right in issue, its 
importance for the individual and the nature of the activities concerned.”121 
Another factor impacting the breadth of the margin is “the existence or non-
existence of common ground between the laws of the Contracting States.”122 
Moreover, the margin may vary not only with respect to different Convention 
provisions, but also with respect to different permissible objectives listed in 
the limitation clauses of Articles 8(2) through 10(2) of the ECHR. For 
example, the Court has granted national legislatures a wide margin in 
regulating the freedom of expression with regard to issues touching upon 
questions of public morality under Article 10(2) due to the lack of interpretive 
agreement among the contracting states. Yet by contrast, where a greater 
degree of agreement was demonstrable, a lesser margin would result. For 
example, while public morality might be subject to strongly divergent 
understandings,  
[p]recisely the same cannot be said of the far more objective notion of the “authority” of 
the judiciary. The domestic law and practice of the Contracting States reveal a fairly 
substantial measure of common ground in this area. This is reflected in a number of 
provisions of the Convention, including Article 6 (art. 6), which have no equivalent as far 
as “morals” are concerned. Accordingly, here a more extensive European supervision 
corresponds to a less discretionary power of appreciation.123 
As a result, the regulation of the maintenance of “the authority and 
impartiality of the judiciary,” 124  also mentioned in Article 10(2) as a 
permissible objective to restrict freedom of expression, is more strictly 
scrutinized by the Court than is the regulation of expression in the name of 
public morality. 
The application of the margin doctrine in the Court’s judicial practice 
has become increasingly intertwined with the consideration of 
proportionality. 125  Although the Court often invokes both the margin and 
                                                                                                                                                                         
121. Buckley v. United Kingdom, 1996-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 1272, ¶ 74; see also Zehentner v. 
Austria, App. No. 20082/02, ¶ 57 (Eur. Ct. H.R. July 16, 2009), http://www.echr.coe.int (noting that the 
“margin will vary according to the nature of the Convention right in issue, its importance for the 
individual and the nature of the activities restricted, as well as the nature of the aim pursued by the 
restrictions”); Johansen v. Norway, 1996-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 1029, ¶ 64. On the factors affecting the 
varying scope of the margin, see, for example, ANNETTE RUPP-SWIENTY, DIE DOKTRIN VON DER 
MARGIN OF APPRECIATION IN DER RECHTSPRECHUNG DES EUROPÄISCHEN GERICHTSHOFS FÜR 
MENSCHENRECHTE [THE DOCTRINE OF THE MARGIN OF APPRECIATION IN THE JURISPRUDENCE OF THE 
EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS] 196 (1999); Paul Mahoney, Marvelous Richness of Diversity or 
Invidious Cultural Relativism?, 19 HUM. RTS. L.J. 1, 5-6 (1998); Jeroen Schokkenbroek, The Basis, 
Nature and Application of the Margin-of-Appreciation Doctrine in the Case-Law of the European Court 
of Human Rights, 19 HUM. RTS. L.J. 30, 34-35 (1998). 
122. Rasmussen v. Denmark, 87 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), ¶ 40 (1984); see also Stambuk v. 
Germany, App. No. 37928/97, ¶ 40 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Oct. 17, 2002), http://www.echr.coe.int (“[I]n the 
field under consideration [the regulation of the medical profession], there are no particular 
circumstances—such as a clear lack of common ground among Member States regarding the principles 
at issue or a need to make allowance for the diversity of moral conceptions . . . which would justify 
granting the national authorities a comparable wide margin of appreciation.” (emphasis added)). 
123. Sunday Times (no. 1) v. United Kingdom, 30 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), ¶ 59 (1979); see also 
Otto-Preminger-Institute v. Austria, 295-A Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) ¶ 50 (1994).  
124. ECHR, supra note 114, art. 10(2).  
125. See Marc-André Eissen, The Principle of Proportionality in the Case-Law of the 
European Court of Human Rights, in THE EUROPEAN SYSTEM FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS, 
supra note 116, at 125, 127-31.  
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proportionality in justifying its decisions, it has so far failed to elaborate the 
precise doctrinal relationship between the two.126 Proportionality is generally 
the last factor assessed in evaluating state measures under the margin of 
appreciation doctrine.127 Proportionality takes into account the context of, and 
the rationale for, a given interference, the consequences for the right at issue, 
and its impact on the applicant.128 In the context of restrictions on the freedom 
of the press, for example, the Court recognizes that states enjoy a certain 
margin of appreciation in regulating press activities, where considered 
necessary. Yet that margin is, in turn, “circumscribed by the interest of 
democratic society in ensuring and maintaining a free press.”129 That same 
“interest will [also] weigh heavily in the balance in determining . . . whether 
the restriction was proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued.”130  
Admittedly, the Court’s jurisprudence on the relationship between the 
margin and proportionality and, consequentially, our explanation of the 
Court’s description of that relationship may still offer insufficient clarity. One 
way in which the relationship between the margin of appreciation and 
proportionality has been conceptualized sees the margin as relating primarily 
“to the legitimacy of the aim of the interference in meeting a pressing social 
need, whereas the doctrine of proportionality concerns the means used to 
achieve that aim.”131 That approach, while recognizing that the margin and 
proportionality are in practice intertwined, does not, however, explain how 
precisely they influence each other. 132  Another useful perspective views 
proportionality analysis itself as being subject to the margin of appreciation, 
with the effect that “in assessing the proportionality of [a] state’s acts, a 
certain degree of deference is given to the judgment of national authorities 
when they weigh competing public and individual interests.”133 
In contrast to either of these approaches as described by the Court, 
looking to its actual practice suggests a relationship between the margin of 
appreciation and proportionality that we find both compelling and 
                                                                                                                                                                         
126. See YUTAKA ARAI-TAKAHASHI, THE MARGIN OF APPRECIATION DOCTRINE AND THE 
PRINCIPLE OF PROPORTIONALITY IN THE JURISPRUDENCE OF THE ECHR 193 (2002).  
127. See D.J. HARRIS ET AL., HARRIS, O’BOYLE & WARBRICK: LAW OF THE EUROPEAN 
CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 358 (2d ed. 2009). 
128. See STEVEN GREER, The Margin of Appreciation: Interpretation and Discretion Under the 
European Convention on Human Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS FILES NO. 17, at 20 (2000).  
129. Fressoz v. France, 1999-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 3, ¶ 45. 
130. Id.; see also Goodwin v. United Kingdom, 1996-II Eur. Ct. H.R. 483, ¶ 40.  
131. CLARE OVEY & ROBIN C.A. WHITE, JACOBS & WHITE: THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON 
HUMAN RIGHTS 240 (4th ed. 2006).  
132. Id. For another example where the existence of both the margin and proportionality is 
merely mentioned but their relationship not further explained, see MARK W. JANIS, RICHARD S. KAY & 
ANTHONY W. BRADLEY, EUROPEAN HUMAN RIGHTS LAW: TEXT AND MATERIALS 243 (3d ed. 2008), 
which notes that the proportionality requirement is “related to the margin of appreciation,” without 
further explication as to the modalities of that relationship. 
133. HARRIS ET AL., supra note 127, at 12; see also David Feldman, Proportionality and the 
Human Rights Act 1998, in THE PRINCIPLE OF PROPORTIONALITY IN THE LAWS OF EUROPE 117, 124 
(Evelyn Ellis ed., 1999) (finding that the margin “diminishes . . . the practical significance of the 
proportionality principle”); Jeremy McBride, Proportionality and the European Convention on Human 
Rights, in THE PRINCIPLE OF PROPORTIONALITY IN THE LAWS OF EUROPE, supra, at 23, 29 (noting that the 
applicability of a certain margin of appreciation to a given restriction weakens any subsequent 
proportionality analysis “since the Court has effectively tipped the scales in favour of the measure 
imposing” the restriction); id. at 30-33 (discussing further the relationship between the margin and 
proportionality analysis). 
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jurisprudentially useful. In practice, the Court uses the margin of appreciation 
to inform its proportionality analysis. In other words, when the Court grants a 
wide margin of appreciation to states in a given issue area, it then transforms 
that wide margin into a greater degree of deference to the national government 
in the proportionality balancing process which follows. A wide margin results 
in a less stringent proportionality test. A narrow margin leads to stricter 
review in the proportionality test. Where a wide margin leads to a deferential 
balancing test, a state action that interferes with individual rights would need 
to be only roughly proportional to the objective pursued. By contrast, where a 
narrow margin leads to a stricter proportionality balancing test, the 
relationship between the state’s action and the objective pursued would need 
to be strictly proportional. A broader margin provides states with greater 
freedom to choose from the range of possible “balances” between competing 
interests, whereas a narrower margin results in a narrowing of the range of 
available choices that are still permissible.  
b. The Margin of Appreciation in the ECtHR’s 
Jurisprudence on the Protection of Property Under 
Article 1 of Protocol 1 
The cases most analogous to investment arbitration in the ECtHR’s 
jurisprudence on the margin of appreciation involve the protection of property 
under Article 1 of Protocol 1 to the ECHR. Article 1 provides that: 
Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No 
one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the 
conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law.  
 
The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a State to 
enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance with 
the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or 
penalties.134 
The Court has interpreted this provision as comprising three separate rules: 
first, the general rule protecting the peaceful enjoyment of property; second, 
the rule regarding modalities of lawful expropriation; and third, the rule that 
permits the regulation of the use of property in the general interest.135 The 
latter two rules address “particular instances of interference with the right to 
peaceful enjoyment of property . . . [and] should . . . be construed in the light 
of the general principle enunciated in the first rule.”136 
The margin of appreciation accorded to states by the Court in the 
regulation of property issues is generally a wide one. The recognition of such 
a wide margin hinges on the concept of the “public interest,” 137  the 
                                                                                                                                                                         
134. ECHR, supra note 114, Protocol 1, art. 1.  
135. See Immobiliare Saffi v. Italy, 1999-V Eur. Ct. H.R. 73, ¶ 44; James v. United Kingdom, 
98 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), ¶ 37 (1986); Sporrong & Lönnroth v. Sweden, 52 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), ¶ 61 
(1982). 
136. Iatridis v. Greece, 1999-II Eur. Ct. H.R. 75, ¶ 55. 
137. The reference to the “general interest“ in paragraph 2 of Article 1 of the Protocol has been 
interpreted by the Court as being essentially identical with the concept of “public interest” and thus does 
not provide a different standard. See James, 98 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), ¶ 43; HARRIS ET AL., supra note 
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furtherance of which must motivate property-regulating measures. As to 
questions of public interest, the Court acknowledged that national authorities, 
because of their closer proximity to the social realities of the community that 
they are entrusted to govern, are better placed to determine what is in the 
public interest and what is not.138 As the Court reaffirmed in Broniowski: 
Under the system of protection established by the Convention, it is thus for the national 
authorities to make the initial assessment as to the existence of a problem of public 
concern warranting measures to be applied in the sphere of the exercise of the right of 
property, including deprivation and restitution of property. Here, as in other fields to 
which the safeguards of the Convention extend, the national authorities accordingly enjoy 
a certain margin of appreciation. 
 
Furthermore, the notion of “public interest” is necessarily extensive. In particular, the 
decision to enact laws expropriating property or affording publicly funded compensation 
for expropriated property will commonly involve consideration of political, economic 
and social issues. The Court has declared that, finding it natural that the margin of 
appreciation available to the legislature in implementing social and economic policies 
should be a wide one, it will respect the legislature’s judgment as to what is “in the public 
interest” unless that judgment is manifestly without reasonable foundation . . . . This logic 
applies to such fundamental changes of a country’s system as the transition from a 
totalitarian regime to a democratic form of government and the reform of the State’s 
political, legal and economic structure, phenomena which inevitably involve the 
enactment of large-scale economic and social legislation.139 
In practice, a state’s identification of a legitimate aim in pursuit of social and 
economic policies is rarely reviewed, and the burden of proof to show that an 
initiative does not further a legitimate aim falls squarely upon the applicant.140  
This wide margin in the pursuit of social and economic policies 
notwithstanding, any measure adopted by a state must also meet the 
requirements of lawfulness141 and proportionality.142 Since its first judgment 
on Article 1 of Protocol 1, the Court has addressed this latter proportionality 
requirement by applying a “fair balance” test.143 The core of the fair balance 
test looks to the presence of “a reasonable relationship of proportionality 
between the means employed and the aim sought to be realized by any 
measures applied by the State, including measures depriving a person of his or 
her possessions.”144 The assessment of such a relationship is not measured 
against any abstract and fixed scale constructed in advance, but instead 
                                                                                                                                                                         
127, at 668. 
138. James, 98 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), ¶ 46.  
139. Broniowski v. Poland, 2004-V Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, ¶ 149 (citations omitted). 
140. See HARRIS ET AL., supra note 127, at 667-68.  
141. The criterion of a measure’s “lawfulness” requires compliance with domestic law as well 
as that the “applicable provisions of domestic law [are] sufficiently accessible, precise and foreseeable.” 
Beyeler v. Italy, 2000-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, ¶¶ 108-109.  
142. See Bubić v. Croatia, App. 23677/07, ¶ 50 (Eur. Ct. H.R. July 9, 2009), 
http://www.echr.coe.int (noting that “[d]espite the margin of appreciation given to the State the Court 
must nevertheless, in the exercise of its power of review, determine whether the requisite balance was 
maintained in a manner consonant with the applicant's right to property” and that such balance would be 
upset if the measures adopted in pursuit of the general interest imposed a “disproportionate burden” on 
the applicant). 
143. See Sporrong & Lönnroth v. Sweden, 52 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), ¶ 69 (1982). 
144. Kozacioğlu v. Turkey, App. 2334/03, ¶ 63 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Feb. 19, 2009), 
http://www.echr.coe.int. 
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involves “an overall examination of the various interests in issue”145 in the 
concrete case. 
In determining whether a fair balance has been struck in cases where 
property is taken by the state, the Court frequently looks to the availability and 
amount of compensation provided to the aggrieved individual. The basic 
requirement for a fair balance to exist is that any compensation paid must be 
reasonably related to the value of the property at issue.146  The Court has 
recognized certain exceptions, noting that “legitimate objectives in the ‘public 
interest,’ such as those pursued in measures of economic reform or measures 
designed to achieve greater social justice, may call for less than 
reimbursement of the full market value,”147  including the absence of any 
compensation at all. 148  For example, the Court has accepted lower 
compensation standards with regard to regulatory takings that further the 
“protection of [a country’s] historical and cultural heritage,”149 nationalization 
of key industries, 150  compensation after relocations following border 
adjustments, 151  the consequences of a country’s regime change, 152  or the 
implications of German reunification.153 
c. Use of the Margin of Appreciation by Other 
International Judicial Bodies 
Several other international dispute settlement bodies, including the 
European Court of Justice (ECJ), the WTO Dispute Settlement Body, the 
Inter-American Court of Human Rights, and North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA) arbitral tribunals, have, if less frequently and 
prominently, applied standards of review similar to the margin of 
appreciation,154 often using the term explicitly. For example, several arbitral 
panels convened under Article 22(6) of the WTO Dispute Settlement 
Understanding (DSU), in disputes concerning the appropriateness of 
retaliatory countermeasures in response to noncompliance with prior panel 
and Appellate Body decisions,155 have concluded that retaliating states possess 
                                                                                                                                                                         
145. Beyeler, 2000-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 57, ¶ 114. 
146. Former King of Greece v. Greece, 2000-XII Eur. Ct. H.R. 119, ¶ 89 (citing Pressos 
Compania Naviera N.A. v. Belgium, 332 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), ¶ 38 (1995)). 
147. Scordino v. Italy (no. 1), 2006-V Eur. Ct. H.R. 91, ¶ 97 (citing James v. United Kingdom, 
98 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), ¶ 54 (1986)). 
148. Holy Monasteries v. Greece, 301 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), ¶ 71 (1994). 
149. Kozacioğlu, App. 2334/03, ¶ 64. 
150. Lithgow v. United Kingdom, 102 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), ¶ 121 (1986).  
151. See Broniowski v. Poland, 2004-V Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, ¶ 182 (2004). 
152. See Zvolský v. Czech Republic, 2002-IX Eur. Ct. H.R. 163, ¶ 72 (describing the 
challenges of reallocating property after a communist regime); Former King of Greece v. Greece, 2000-
XII Eur. Ct. H.R. 119, ¶ 87. 
153. Jahn v. Germany, 2005-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 55, ¶ 117 (2005); Von Maltzan v. Germany, 
2005-V Eur. Ct. H.R. 395, ¶ 77.  
154. See Onder Bakircioglu, The Application of the Margin of Appreciation Doctrine in 
Freedom of Expression and Public Morality Cases, 8 GERMAN L.J. 711, 713 (2007); Paolo G. Carozza, 
Subsidiarity as a Structural Principle of International Human Rights Law, 97 AM. J. INT’L L. 38, 55-56 
(2003); Jenny S. Martinez, Towards an International Judicial System, 56 STAN. L. REV. 429, 519 
(2003); Shany, supra note 61, at 927-31. 
155. On this procedure, see PETER VAN DEN BOSSCHE, THE LAW AND POLICY OF THE WORLD 
TRADE ORGANIZATION: TEXT, CASES AND MATERIALS § 3.4.4.4, at 305-06 (2d ed. 2008). 
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a margin of appreciation in assessing the appropriateness of such 
countermeasures: 
Not only is a Member entitled to take countermeasures that are tailored to offset the 
original wrongful act and the upset of the balancing of rights and obligations which that 
wrongful act entails, but in assessing the “appropriateness” of such countermeasures—in 
light of the gravity of the breach—a margin of appreciation is to be granted, due to the 
severity of that breach.156  
Another WTO arbitration panel addressed the margin approach explicitly as a 
judicial standard of review. That panel affirmed that states enjoy a margin of 
appreciation in the context of deciding whether it is “practicable or 
effective,”157 to retaliate within the same sector at issue in the relevant panel 
or Appellate Body decision that gave rise to the authorization of 
countermeasures. Specifically, the panel concluded that because states enjoy a 
margin of appreciation, 
the margin of review by the Arbitrators implies the authority to broadly judge whether 
the complaining party in question has considered the necessary facts objectively and 
whether, on the basis of these facts, it could plausibly arrive at the conclusion that it was 
not practicable or effective to seek suspension within the same sector under the same 
agreements, or only under another agreement provided that the circumstances were 
serious enough.158 
This approach, also adopted in 2007 by the panel in US—Gambling,159 clearly 
echoes the ECtHR’s approach to the margin of appreciation. Each 
adjudicatory body identified a deferential standard of review under which it 
abstained from strictly scrutinizing the facts of the situation and the initial 
appraisal of those facts by the competent state authorities. Instead, the tribunal 
looked only at the extent to which the respondent state could show that it 
considered such facts in a nonbiased manner and drew reasonable conclusions 
from them. 
3. Good Faith Review 
A third potential public law standard of review derives from a general 
principle of international law—good faith. Because good faith has long been a 
                                                                                                                                                                         
156. Decision of the Arbitrator, US—Tax Treatment of “Foreign Sales Corporation,” ¶ 5.62, 
WT/DS108/ARB (Aug. 30, 2002); see also id. ¶ 6.55.  
157. The relevant parts of Article 22(3) of the DSU provide that 
[i]n considering what concessions or other obligations to suspend, the complaining party 
shall apply the following principles and procedures: . . . (b) if that party considers that it 
is not practicable or effective to suspend concessions or other obligations with respect to 
the same sector(s), it may seek to suspend concessions or other obligations in other 
sectors under the same agreement; (c) if that party considers that it is not practicable or 
effective to suspend concessions or other obligations with respect to other sectors under 
the same agreement, and that the circumstances are serious enough, it may seek to 
suspend concessions or other obligations under another covered agreement . . . . 
Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes art. 22(3), 33 I.L.M. 112 
(1994), available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dsu_e.htm. 
158. See Decision by the Arbitrators, EC—Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of 
Bananas III, ¶ 52, WT/DS27/ARB/ECU (Mar. 24, 2000). 
159. See Decision by the Arbitrator, US—Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of 
Gambling and Betting Services, ¶¶ 4.16-.18, WT/DS285/ARB (Dec. 21, 2007). 
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core principle of international law, 160  it can also serve as a standard for 
reviewing state behavior.161 Admittedly, good faith is an extremely lenient 
standard. It allows states to balance conflicting rights and interests and defers 
to the state’s own resolution of that balancing, as long as the state’s 
determination was made in good faith and was reasonable. A good faith 
standard still requires weighing and balancing irreconcilable interests, but 
shifts that balancing process to the national government. The review at the 
international level then does not seek to balance such interests itself, but 
instead asks whether the respondent state has rationally balanced conflicting 
rights and interests and acted with honesty and fair dealing. While deferential 
to a state’s own determinations, good faith review is not hollow. It requires 
states to internalize the balancing process and offer a rational basis for their 
ultimate determinations. 
Unfortunately, the paucity of jurisprudence on the principle of good faith 
means that the practical standards for undertaking a good faith review are 
underdeveloped and arbitrators may find the standard lacking specificity. The 
“good faith” standard in treaty performance is, however, well established and 
offers a useful starting point for the development of good faith as a standard of 
review. The 1949 Draft Declaration on the Rights and Duties of States 
included such a standard in Article 13. 162  As the International Law 
Commission’s commentary on the provision noted, it was seen as “a re-
instatement of the fundamental principle pacta sunt servanda.”163  
As a standard of review, good faith has two basic elements: first, 
whether the state has engaged in honest and fair dealing and, second, whether 
there is a rational basis for the action taken by the government. Perhaps the 
best articulation of the honesty and fair dealing element of good faith review 
is contained in the 1935 Harvard Research on the Law of Treaties, according 
to which:  
The obligation to fulfill in good faith a treaty engagement requires that its stipulations be 
observed in their spirit as well as according to their letter, and that what has been 
promised be performed without evasion or subterfuge, honestly, and to the best of the 
ability of the party which made the promise.164  
The question then is whether the state has acted honestly and to the best of its 
ability in balancing its own permissible interests with the rights of, for 
example, foreign investors. Where evidence exists that a state invokes its 
interests, perhaps through a BIT NPM clause, just as a pretext for ulterior 
economic motives, or where the connection between the measures taken and 
national security is so spurious as to clearly breach the good faith 
                                                                                                                                                                         
160. See Draft Declaration on Rights and Duties of States, G.A. Res. 375 (IV), Annex art. 13, 
U.N. GAOR, 4th Sess. (Dec. 6, 1949). 
161. See generally JOHN O’CONNOR, GOOD FAITH IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1991). 
162. “Every State has the duty to carry out in good faith its obligations arising from treaties and 
other sources of international law, and it may not invoke provisions in its constitution or its laws as an 
excuse for failure to perform this duty.” Draft Declaration on the Rights and Duties of States, supra note 
160, art. 13. 
163. See id. 
164. Codification of International Law, 29 AM. J. INT’L L. 1, 981 (Supp. 1935).  
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requirement, 165  a tribunal could find that the state had not satisfied the 
standard.  
The second element of good faith review involves a determination of 
whether there was a rational basis for the outcome of the state’s own internal 
balancing process. This element of the good faith test may have been best 
expressed by the International Whaling Commission in its evaluation of the 
good faith requirements of the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea.166 
According to the Commission, good faith requires “fairness, reasonableness, 
integrity and honesty in international behaviour.” 167  The reasonableness 
requirement stressed by the Commission requires that the state have some 
rational basis for its actions. The question a tribunal must ask is whether a 
reasonable person in the state’s position could have concluded that its 
permissible interests—for example, the need to protect essential security 
through the invocation of an NPM clause—outweighed the protected rights 
and interests of investors.  
Two examples are illustrative of this element of good faith review in 
practice. If, for example, a landlocked state such as Switzerland were to 
invoke an NPM clause and claim a security threat from increasingly severe 
tidal ranges and the attendant threats of flooding, a tribunal would have to 
conclude that there was no rational basis to believe that the respondent state 
was indeed threatened by that phenomenon and hence that the clause had not 
been invoked in good faith. In contrast, should an island state invoke an NPM 
clause to build sea barriers citing the potential for global warming to raise sea 
levels, notwithstanding potentially contradictory scientific evidence, the 
tribunal would have to conclude that the state had a rational basis for its 
determination and that the reasonableness element of good faith review was 
satisfied. 
In operationalizing good faith as a standard of review, a tribunal would 
look to see if the state had justified its actions by giving reasons for those 
actions and undertaking its own internal balancing process. A tribunal might 
then test both the state’s fair dealing and the reasonableness of its actions by 
looking to efforts by the state to reconcile competing interests through 
negotiation, the timing of a state’s actions, the availability of less restrictive 
measures, and the duration of measures taken. The result would be 
meaningful, albeit limited review. 
We have outlined the extremely strict “no other means available” 
standard applied by the early ICSID tribunals and three distinct alternatives 
that operate in international public law adjudication—the least restrictive 
means test, the margin of appreciation, and good faith review. With the 
exception of the strict no other means available test employed by the early 
                                                                                                                                                                         
165. An illustrative example of this is provided by Sweden’s attempt in 1975 to justify import 
quotas on footwear for national security reasons under the GATT. See John A. Spanogle, Jr., Can 
Helms-Burton Be Challenged Under the WTO?, 27 STETSON L. REV. 1313, 1331 (1998). 
166. See United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea art. 300, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 
U.N.T.S. 397, 137 (“States Parties shall fulfil in good faith the obligations assumed under this 
Convention and shall exercise the rights, jurisdiction and freedoms recognized in this Convention in a 
manner which would not constitute an abuse of right.”).  
167. Int’l Whaling Comm’n, Resolution 2001-1 (2001), available at http://www.iwcoffice.org/ 
meetings/resolutions/resolution2001.htm. 
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ICSID tribunals, the remaining three standards each offer different 
mechanisms for weighing and balancing competing rights and interests. This 
Subsection compares and contrasts those standards to offer a clear picture of 
their differences in practice. As a general matter, the standards have been 
presented in order of increasing deference to the respondent state’s regulatory 
activity, with the “no other means available” test offering essentially no 
deference to the respondent state, the least restrictive alternative test offering 
greater deference, the margin of appreciation offering perhaps more 
deference, and good faith review giving states the greatest deference.  
B. Judicial Deference in Domestic Public Law 
Having examined standards of review including the least restrictive 
alternative, the margin of appreciation, and good faith used by some 
international tribunals, we now turn to a consideration of standards of review 
used in particular domestic legal systems, with a focus on the United States 
and Germany. One critical problem with the current state of international 
public law arbitration is the lack of clarity and sound theoretical 
underpinnings for the choice of applicable standards of review. Different 
courts and tribunals apply different standards to similarly situated cases. At 
best, those choices are guided by the specific precedents of the forum; at 
worst, by the whims of a particular arbitral tribunal. Yet ICSID tribunals are 
far from the first courts to confront the question of what standard of review to 
apply in public law disputes. Domestic legal systems have created well-
developed standards of review and clear criteria for determining the 
appropriate standard to apply in different types of public law adjudication. 
An examination of the public law standards of review used in the United 
States and Germany shows similarities with international approaches and 
highlights the importance of theoretical consistency in the standard of review 
applied in different types of public law adjudication. We focus our analysis 
here on the United States and Germany for two reasons. First, the legal 
systems of the United States and Germany are very different—one is based on 
common law, the other on civil law—and the similarities in the standards of 
review in both systems are, therefore, noteworthy. Second, the United States 
and Germany are two of the most significant players in the international 
investment system and have two of the longest standing BIT programs.  
1. Judicial Deference and Standards of Review in the United 
States 
In the United States, the choice of a standard of review arises in a 
number of distinct contexts, two of which merit detailed consideration: 
constitutional adjudication and administrative law review of agency 
regulation. In both of these contexts, U.S. courts have developed standards of 
public law review that calibrate appropriate levels of judicial scrutiny and 
deference to other decisionmakers in ways that are both consistent and 
justifiable. The result is a well-honed system for allocation of deference that, 
while using language distinct from the international context, results in 
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standards similar to good faith, the least restrictive means, and the margin of 
appreciation.168 Unlike the international system, which lacks clear principles 
to guide the choice of standard of review, the U.S. system highlights the 
potential for a coherent set of principles based on both the nature of the rights 
at stake and the comparative expertise of courts and other actors to guide the 
determination of the appropriate standard of review.  
In U.S. constitutional review, domestic courts examine governmental 
actions that infringe on constitutionally protected individual rights. Three 
different standards of scrutiny are used in U.S. constitutional law and have 
been described by one leading scholar as “instructions for balancing” between 
competing individual rights and governmental objectives.169 These standards 
for constitutional review find their origins in the Carolene Products decision 
of 1937, in which the U.S. Supreme Court observed, in a famous footnote, that 
“more searching judicial inquiry” is appropriate when the law in question 
“interferes with individual rights, . . . restricts the ability of the political 
process to repeal undesirable legislation, or . . . discriminates against a 
‘discrete or insular minority.’”170 
The first of these standards, rational basis review, upholds the 
constitutionality of a law if the legislation is rationally related to a legitimate 
government purpose.171 In most such cases, courts defer to Congress based 
upon the presumption that legislatures are better positioned than courts to set 
economic and social policy, to the degree those policies do not conflict with 
fundamental rights or target a protected class of persons.172  
Under the second of these standards, intermediate scrutiny, U.S. courts 
engage in a stricter review and give less deference to the legislature with 
respect to laws that draw distinctions based on gender, 173  illegitimacy 
classifications, 174  or that regulate commercial speech. 175  When applying 
                                                                                                                                                                         
168. A further “standard” resulting in judicial deference to other decisionmakers that merits 
mentioning here is the political question doctrine, which U.S. courts can invoke to decline deciding a 
case at all. The principal reasons courts have declared an issue to be a political question are the clear 
constitutional allocation of decision-making powers to another branch of government, the absence of 
judicially manageable standards, and various forms of prudential abstention. See, e.g., Baker v. Carr, 
369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).  
169. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 539 (3d ed. 
2006). 
170. Id. at 540. 
171. See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631 (1996); Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 
483 (1955) (finding that health concerns provided rational basis for law preferring optometrists over 
opticians); Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949) (noting that concerns over 
traffic safety and right of government to combat one evil at a time provided a rational basis for a law 
prohibiting vehicles devoted purely to advertising but allowing advertising on delivery vehicles). 
172. See Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970) (“[If a] classification has some 
reasonable basis, it does not offend the Constitution simply because the classification is not made with 
mathematical nicety or because, in practice, it results in some inequality.” (internal quotations and 
citations omitted)). 
173. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996) (invalidating a policy restricting 
women from attending a state military school); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (invalidating 
an Oklahoma statute that prohibited sale of “near-beer” to males under the age of twenty-one and to 
females under eighteen). 
174. See Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456 (1988) (declaring unconstitutional a law that required a 
nonmarital child to establish paternity within six years of birth in order to seek support from his or her 
father); Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983) (upholding New York statute permitting adoption of 
nonmarital child without notice to the biological father). 
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intermediate scrutiny, courts will ask whether the legislation furthers an 
important governmental purpose and is substantially related to that purpose.176  
The least deferential standard, strict scrutiny, applies where legislation 
draws distinctions based on suspect classifications, such as race, national 
origin,177 or alienage,178 where it burdens a fundamental right,179 or where it 
imposes a content-based restriction on the freedom of speech.180 Under strict 
scrutiny, courts examine legislation to determine if it is narrowly tailored to 
achieve a compelling governmental purpose.181 Specifically, the law must be 
the least restrictive or least discriminatory alternative to achieve the 
government’s important goal.182  
The standards of review in U.S. constitutional law offer important 
parallels to those applied in international public law adjudication. Specifically, 
the rational basis test in U.S. constitutional law is remarkably similar to the 
good faith standard in international law. Rational basis review requires only 
that the legislation be rationally related to a legitimate government purpose. 
International good faith review similarly requires honesty and fair dealing by 
the state and a rational basis for its actions. Both standards are extremely 
deferential to the government. Lawrence Tribe’s observations with respect to 
the leniency of rational basis review domestically are also applicable with 
respect to the international law good faith standard:  
This remarkable deference to state objectives has operated in the sphere of economic 
regulation quite apart from whether the conceivable [purpose] (1) actually exists, (2) 
would convincingly justify the classification if it did exist, or (3) was ever urged in the 
classification’s defense either by those who promulgated it or by those who argued in its 
support.183 
The strict scrutiny approach of U.S. courts finds its international parallel 
in the least restrictive alternative test employed by the WTO. In both contexts, 
the reviewing court or tribunal inquires whether the enacting government has 
chosen the least restrictive or least discriminatory means to achieve a 
                                                                                                                                                                         
175. See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980) (holding 
that a complete ban on advertising to promote the use of electricity by a utility violates the First and 
Fourteenth Amendments). 
176. See, e.g., Craig, 429 U.S. at 197 (“[C]lassifications by gender must serve important 
governmental objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of those objectives.”). 
177. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995) (holding that all racial 
classifications imposed by federal, state, or local government actors are to be analyzed under strict 
scrutiny); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (rejecting Virginia’s ban on miscegenation under strict 
scrutiny). 
178. See, e.g., Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634 (1973) (requiring the application of strict 
scrutiny for alienage classifications). 
179. See, e.g., Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (applying strict scrutiny to a regulation 
restricting the free exercise of religion). 
180. See United States v. Playboy Entm’t Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803 (2000) (applying strict 
scrutiny to regulation of sexually oriented cable networks); Sable Commc’ns of Cal., Inc. v. Fed. 
Commc’ns Comm’n, 492 U.S. 115 (1989) (applying the same to sexually oriented prerecorded 
telephone messages). 
181. See Adarand, 515 U.S. at 227 (holding that all classifications on the basis of race are 
subject to strict scrutiny). 
182. See, e.g., Thomas v. Review Bd. of the Ind. Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 718 
(1981) (“The state may justify an inroad on religious liberty by showing that it is the least restrictive 
means of achieving some compelling state interest.”). 
183. LAWRENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1443 (2d ed. 1988). 
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permissible objective. Both domestic strict scrutiny and the WTO’s least 
restrictive means test are more deferential than the only means available test 
used by early ICSID tribunals. In contrast with the early ICSID approach, the 
WTO least restrictive means test and the U.S. strict scrutiny approach, while 
difficult to satisfy, are not impossible to overcome and leave room for some 
residual deference to other branches of government or national authorities.184 
One of the most striking differences between standards of review in U.S. 
constitutional law and those found internationally is the justification for the 
choice of an applicable standard of review. The U.S. domestic system offers a 
far more coherent approach to determining the applicable standard in any 
given case than do most international tribunals. In U.S. constitutional practice, 
the determination of the applicable standard is particularly critical, as it is 
often outcome-determinative. Rational basis scrutiny is usually sufficiently 
deferential that legislation will survive judicial review. In contrast, strict 
scrutiny is an extremely difficult burden for the government to meet and is 
often referred to as “strict in theory and fatal in fact.”185  
In Equal Protection Clause jurisprudence, for example, a U.S. court 
selects a particular standard of review based on the nature of the divisions the 
legislation in question draws between classes of individuals. The more suspect 
the classification in question, the stricter the scrutiny employed by the 
tribunal. Legislation of a general nature is subject only to rational basis 
review; more suspect classifications, such as gender, are subject to 
intermediate scrutiny; the most suspect classes, such as race, are subject to 
strict scrutiny. While the nature of the rights at stake in international public 
law adjudication are different and the classification approach used by U.S. 
courts might not be appropriate in international adjudication, the U.S. system 
offers at least a coherent, justifiable, and predictable set of principles on which 
to determine the appropriate standard of scrutiny, and hence deference to the 
legislature—something urgently needed at the international level.  
In administrative law, U.S. courts again apply distinct standards of 
review based on separate theoretical assumptions about the respective roles of 
the judicial and executive branches. These administrative law standards 
likewise have important parallels with and possible lessons for international 
public law adjudication. In challenges to formal administrative agency action 
based on an agency’s interpretation of the congressional statute giving it 
authority to act, U.S. courts have developed doctrinal standards that allow 
them to defer to the agency’s interpretation and administrative action due to 
the agency’s comparative expertise in that field, even if the application of 
such standards in practice, at least at the level of the U.S. Supreme Court, is 
less than consistent.186 Specifically, under Chevron deference187 courts will 
                                                                                                                                                                         
184. Adam Winkler, Fatal in Theory and Strict in Fact: An Empirical Analysis of Strict 
Scrutiny in the Federal Courts, 59 VAND. L. REV. 793, 795-96 (2006) (finding, through empirical study, 
that thirty percent of all applications of strict scrutiny result in the validation of the challenged law). 
185. Gerald Gunther, Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A 
Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 (1972). But see Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 
U.S. 306, 326-28 (2003) (upholding a racial classification under strict scrutiny).  
186. See generally William N. Eskridge & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference: 
Supreme Court Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations from Chevron to Hamdan, 96 GEO. L.J. 
1083 (2008) (analyzing different standards of judicial deference to agency statutory interpretation and 
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first ask whether the congressional legislation on which the agency relies 
expressly grants the agency authority to act, is ambiguous, or leaves a gap that 
Congress intended the agency to fill. If any of those three possibilities are met, 
the court will proceed to a second step and ask if the agency interpretation of 
the statute is reasonable. If so, the court will defer to the agency. In contrast, if 
the agency interpretation runs contrary to an unambiguous statute or if the 
agency interpretation is unreasonable, then the court will invalidate the agency 
action. As a general matter, the Chevron approach is deferential to agency 
action and expertise.188  
Like U.S. constitutional review, these administrative standards of 
deference have significant parallels in international public law adjudication. In 
essence, Chevron deference operates similarly to the margin of appreciation 
used by the ECtHR. Within a limited margin of appreciation, namely the 
sphere of authority delegated to the agency by statute or within a gray zone of 
ambiguous delegation of authority, U.S. courts will generally defer to any 
reasonable agency interpretation. Similarly, at the international level, the 
ECtHR accords national governments a margin of appreciation and grants 
their determinations deference unless those determinations are “manifestly 
without reasonable foundation” and fail a residual balancing test.189 Though 
Chevron deference and the margin of appreciation use different language and 
rely on distinct legal foundations, the two tests have striking similarities in 
practice. 
Significantly, Chevron deference and the margin of appreciation rely on 
similar theoretical justifications, again highlighting the importance of 
consistency in determining an appropriate standard of review. Both Chevron 
and the margin recognize that administrative agencies or national 
governments are often better placed and have greater expertise to make policy 
determinations than are courts or international tribunals, respectively. Writing 
for the Court in Chevron, Justice Stevens observed that perhaps Congress, 
“thinking that those with great expertise and charged with responsibility for 
administering the provision would be in a better position” to make difficult 
policy calls, empowered administrative agencies. Further, he observed: 
“Judges are not experts in the field . . . . In contrast, an agency to which 
Congress has delegated policymaking responsibilities may, within the limits 
of that delegation, properly rely upon the incumbent administration’s views of 
wise policy to inform its judgments.”190 Similarly, the ECtHR has justified its 
application of the margin on the basis of the comparatively greater expertise 
and political understanding of national governments, noting that “because of 
                                                                                                                                                                         
tracking their application in Supreme Court practice).  
187. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
188. See generally Thomas W. Merrill & Kristen E. Hickman, Chevron’s Domain, 89 GEO. L.J. 
833 (2001) (discussing the range of deference under Chevron). Even if the Chevron test does not apply 
in a given case, administrative agencies may still receive some degree of deference under the “power to 
persuade” standard articulated in Skidmore v. Swift & Co., based on the agencies’ “specialized 
experience and broader investigations and information.” 323 U.S. 134, 139 (1944); see also United 
States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 234 (2001) (holding that Chevron did not eliminate the applicability 
of Skidmore deference). 
189. Broniowski v. Poland, 2004-V Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, ¶ 149. 
190. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865. 
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their direct knowledge of their society and its needs, the national authorities 
are in principle better placed than the international judge to appreciate what is 
‘in the public interest’” and that “[u]nder the system of protection established 
by the Convention, it is thus for the national authorities to make the initial 
assessment as to the existence of a problem of public concern warranting”191 a 
relevant and specific response. U.S. courts and the ECtHR may express this 
justification differently. For U.S. courts, deference may be a matter of 
institutional capacity, whereas for the ECtHR it may be a matter of 
subsidiarity,192 but at their core the justifications are nearly identical. 
2. Judicial Deference and Standards of Review in Germany  
The German legal system has also developed a theoretically grounded 
and consistent set of standards of review applicable in different types of public 
law adjudication. German domestic law recognizes both a margin of 
appreciation standard as well as a proportionality test. The margin approach is 
principally employed in administrative law adjudication in two distinct 
contexts and proportionality analysis is used by the Federal Constitutional 
Court (FCC) in constitutional law review.  
German administrative law distinguishes two types of administrative 
action that are subject to limited review by the courts. 193  First, where 
administrative agencies have been explicitly granted statutory authority to 
choose among alternative courses of action that may follow from an 
applicable norm (the so-called Rechtsfolgenseite), courts will refrain from 
reviewing the substance of their decision. In statutory language, such 
administrative discretion (Ermessen) is usually indicated by trigger terms in 
the applicable statute such as “may,” “can,” or “is authorized to,” rather than 
obligatory terms such as “must” or “has to.” These terms signal the final and 
thus nonreviewable substantive decision-making authority of the relevant 
agency, either with respect to whether it wants to regulate at all 
(Entschließungsermessen) or with regard to the choice of specific regulatory 
options (Auswahlermessen). Any agency decision must still comply with 
procedural requirements and courts can still review such decisions to ensure 
that they are within the confines and purpose of the statutorily granted 
discretion.194 If the agency is acting within the confines of the statutorily 
                                                                                                                                                                         
191. Bubić v. Croatia, App. No. 23677/07, ¶ 40 (Eur. Ct. H.R. July 9, 2009), 
http://www.echr.coe.int. 
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granted discretion, then the agency’s decision will stand and not be further 
reviewed by the courts. In particular, courts will not consider arguments that 
there were better or more appropriate choices available to the administrative 
agency than the regulation undertaken.195 
 Although this area of nonreviewable administrative decisionmaking in 
German administrative law is phrased as one of (a margin of) discretion and 
does not explicitly invoke the margin of appreciation, the freedom to choose 
among alternative measures provided for in the authorizing statute harmonizes 
in principle with the ECtHR’s concept of the margin of appreciation.  
Judicial deference in this context is justified by the fact that the 
legislature has specifically delegated decision-making authority to 
administrative bodies, which the courts must respect. Because parliament will 
often delegate such decision-making authority when it believes that the 
relevant administrative actor is in a better position to make decisions in a 
given context based on its expertise and proximity to the facts of a case, 
judicial deference in these circumstances is based on similar foundations to 
the deference shown to administrative agencies in the United States and to 
national authorities in the European human rights context. 
The second area in which German courts grant administrative agencies 
some nonreviewable freedom of choice involves agency interpretations of 
indeterminate legal terms such as “public security and order,” the “public 
interest,” or “necessary protection.” Academic commentators and judicial 
practice have both recognized that the scope of this form of nonreviewable 
agency discretion (Beurteilungsspielraum), which literally translates as 
“margin of appreciation ” or “margin of appraisal,” is not of a general nature 
and is only exceptionally granted in certain types of cases. The indeterminate 
nature of a legal term is thus necessary, but not sufficient, to trigger a 
nonreviewable administrative margin of appreciation. 196  Courts recognize 
such a margin with respect to, for example, agency decisions taken as part of 
various types of admission tests and examinations; career evaluations of 
public servants; and agency planning, forecasting, and risk assessment.197  
Such planning, forecasting and risk assessment determinations are 
notably similar to the types of governmental regulation often at stake in public 
law ICSID arbitrations. While German courts have not developed a standard 
catalogue of criteria for determining whether a nonreviewable margin should 
be granted in a particular case,198 academic writing has distilled a number of 
indicators. Those indicators include (1) the absence of judicially manageable 
normative standards that could determine whether an interpretation and the 
decision based on it are to be considered right or wrong, (2) the inadequacy of 
judicial proceedings to generate general interpretations that could 
appropriately cover multiple cases, and (3) the presence of basic 
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epistemological problems that require, by their very nature, an iterative 
process of repeated adjustments based on new facts and insights.199  
In contrast with many other European states, Germany has relatively 
strong judicial review of administrative action. In fact, in Germany there is a 
constitutional right to review of administrative acts.200 Yet it is noteworthy 
that Germany nonetheless recognizes areas of discretionary decisionmaking 
which the courts, for normative or functional reasons, will not review. In any 
event, where it exists, the notion of an administrative Beurteilungsspielraum is 
essentially coextensive with the margin of appreciation as employed in the 
ECtHR’s jurisprudence: both grant to other public decisionmakers a certain 
degree of freedom in interpreting and applying indeterminate legal terms.  
Public law standards of review are also used in German constitutional 
law, in which the FCC applies both a graduated system of standards of review 
as well as the principle of proportionality. Graduated standards of review are 
generally used by the FCC in the evaluation of factual assessments and of 
forecasts undertaken by the legislature. The FCC has recognized standards of 
review including: (1) strict scrutiny (intensivierte inhaltliche Kontrolle), under 
which the FCC will undertake its own evaluation of a given situation, over a 
“tenability” test; (2) Vertretbarkeitskontrolle, which requires primarily that 
procedural requirements have been observed; and (3) manifest 
unconstitutionality (Evidenzkontrolle), under which the Court will strike down 
legislation only if it evidently clashes with constitutional values.201 While the 
criteria for determining what standard will be applied in which circumstances 
are not always straightforward, where an issue area is sufficiently complex 
and forecasts are necessarily subject to some uncertainty, one of the two lesser 
standards of review will generally be applied.202  
Proportionality analysis features prominently in the FCC’s civil rights 
adjudication. In assessing whether an act of a public authority satisfies 
proportionality analysis, the FCC conducts a tripartite test.203 First, the FCC 
asks whether the chosen measure can effectively contribute to the 
achievement of the given objective (Geeignetheit, suitability). To meet this 
requirement, the measure need not be the most effective one available, but 
must contribute to the stated goal. Second, the FCC asks whether the stated 
objective could have been achieved as effectively by using an alternative 
measure that would have less adversely affected other legal interests at issue 
without imposing too excessive a burden on the state (Erforderlichkeit, 
necessity). Third, even if the first two requirements have been met, the FCC 
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asks in a final step whether the infringement of the claimant’s legal position 
can still be considered reasonable in light of the public good pursued 
(Angemessenheit, proportionality or balancing sensu stricto). This part of the 
analysis thus involves a balancing of conflicting legal interests 
(Güterabwägung). The more fundamental the public good to be pursued or 
protected in this balancing, the more an individual claimant may have to 
suffer an interference with his or her legal position. 
The justifications for judicial deference in the German legal system are 
similar to those advanced in U.S. administrative law and the European human 
rights context, linking deference either explicitly or implicitly with the 
superior expertise and comparatively better positioning of administrative 
agencies, or with the absence of judicially manageable and sufficiently 
grounded normative standards by which executive and legislative conduct 
could be properly evaluated. The FCC’s use of proportionality is generally 
taken as a self-evident element of rule-of-law and human rights, needing no 
deeper justification.204 
3. Conclusion  
A comparison of the standards of review used by other tribunals in 
international public law adjudication demonstrated that there already exists a 
range of potential standards on which ICSID tribunals could draw in 
reviewing state regulatory behavior. That comparison also showed that, by 
applying such standards, international tribunals are able to calibrate an 
appropriate degree of deference to national authorities, while still protecting 
the rights of other parties. The subsequent examination of standards of review 
in U.S. and German law showed the considerable parallels between 
international standards and their domestic counterparts. Likewise, both the 
U.S. and German legal systems highlight the importance of consistent and 
coherent rules for determining the appropriate standards of review in any 
given case. In international courts, as well as both the U.S. and German 
domestic systems, the level of deference often turns on, among other things, 
the nature of the substantive rights at stake and the relative expertise of courts 
and other actors in the system. What emerges from the consideration of both 
the international and domestic systems is that international public law 
arbitrations urgently need a coherent set of standards of review and 
appropriate rules for selecting among them based on the substantive rights at 
stake and the relative expertise of the government and arbitral tribunal. 
V. TOWARD A CONSISTENT AND THEORETICALLY GROUNDED 
INTERNATIONAL APPROACH TO STANDARDS OF  
REVIEW IN PUBLIC LAW ADJUDICATION 
Having demonstrated the public law nature of many ICSID arbitrations 
today and the failure of early ICSID tribunals to recognize this new context of 
investor-state arbitration, we engaged in a comparative public law analysis of 
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available standards of review in international and domestic law on which 
ICSID tribunals could draw. We now draw on that comparative analysis of the 
standards of review used by international and domestic tribunals to develop a 
more focused argument as to the most appropriate standard for ICSID 
tribunals to adopt in reviewing state public law regulatory activities. 
Specifically, we contend that, for reasons of institutional capacity, ICSID 
tribunals ought to use the margin of appreciation as the basis for a consistent 
and coherent approach to reviewing state public regulation. The institutional 
capacity of ICSID tribunals—both in terms of their expertise and relative 
embeddedness in the political communities whose disputes they adjudicate—
sets them apart considerably from the domestic tribunals discussed in Section 
IV.B, above, and even from most other international tribunals, discussed in 
Section IV.A, above. Those differences militate against strict standards of 
review, such as strict scrutiny applied in appropriate cases by U.S. courts, and 
auger in favor of more deferential standards, such as the margin of 
appreciation developed by the European Court of Human Rights. 
This Part begins by showing how even more recent ICSID tribunals have 
confused the available standards discussed in Part IV. Thereafter, we consider 
the institutional capacity of ICSID tribunals—in terms of both expertise and 
embeddedness—to suggest that ICSID tribunals are poorly equipped to 
engage in direct rights balancing and ought to grant greater deference to 
national authorities. Finally, we argue that, while other approaches that 
require tribunals to engage primarily in direct rights balancing, such as 
proportionality analysis, are better than the jurisprudential status quo, 
adopting the margin of appreciation as the applicable standard in such cases 
best suits the peculiar circumstances of investor-state arbitration and the 
limited capacities of ad hoc ICSID tribunals. 
A. Melding (or Confusing?) the Standards: Recent ICSID 
Jurisprudence 
As noted above, while early ICSID jurisprudence more or less uniformly 
followed the strict “no other means available” standard in reviewing state 
behavior, more recently ICSID tribunals have, appropriately, adopted 
somewhat more deferential standards of review. Even the jurisprudence of 
these more recent tribunals that have sought to grant national authorities a 
degree of deference has been problematic for two reasons. First, each tribunal 
borrows different elements of the standards we discussed in Part IV, resulting 
in a review of state behavior that may not adequately balance the conflicting 
interests at stake. Second, these tribunals’ approaches are far from uniform, 
resulting in continued ambiguity in and conflict over the applicable standard 
of review in similar public law settings. 
Three cases frame the problematic jurisprudence of the more recent 
ICSID cases: LG&E v. Argentine Republic, 205  Continental Casualty v. 
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Argentine Republic,206 and Biwater Gauff (Tanzania) Ltd. v. United Republic 
of Tanzania.207 Rather than coherently justify and consistently deploy a single 
standard in reviewing a state’s public law regulatory activity, each of these 
tribunals invoked two or more of the standards of review discussed above in 
potentially contradictory ways. In particular, the more recent ICSID tribunals 
have made explicit reference to the least restrictive alternative test, the margin 
of appreciation, and good faith review. The result has been a melding or, 
perhaps, a confusing of approaches, rather than the emergence of a clear 
standard of review for public law arbitration. The least restrictive alternative, 
the margin of appreciation, and good faith review are distinct and independent 
standards with separate jurisprudential approaches to balance competing rights 
and interests. Attempts to meld two or more of these approaches into a single 
standard of review are dangerous because of the distinct balancing 
mechanisms each standard employs.  
The first ICSID award to move away from the strict only means 
available test was LG&E, decided in October 2006. The tribunal never clearly 
articulated the applicable standard for reviewing Argentina’s behavior, but 
suggested that elements of the least restrictive alternative test, the margin of 
appreciation, and good faith review were relevant. In granting Argentina 
greater deference than had tribunals in the earlier cases, the LG&E tribunal 
broadened the interpretation of “necessary” through a balancing process 
similar to that developed by the WTO Appellate Body in US—Gambling and 
Korea—Beef. The LG&E tribunal observed:  
In this circumstanc[e], an economic recovery package was the only means to respond to 
the crisis. Although there may have been a number of ways to draft the economic 
recovery plan, the evidence before the tribunal demonstrates that an across-the-board 
response was necessary, and the tariffs on public utilities had to be addressed.208  
The LG&E tribunal did not ask if a slightly different recovery package could 
have been employed, but merely determined that some across-the-board 
recovery package was needed. The tribunal, at least implicitly, weighed the 
grave nature of Argentina’s interests at stake in the economic crisis against the 
infringement on investor rights caused by Argentina’s recovery plan, finding 
that as a result of that balancing in these circumstances, “necessary” ought to 
be interpreted somewhat more broadly.209 The tribunal noted:  
Certainly, the conditions in Argentina in December 2001 called for immediate, decisive 
action to restore civil order and stop the economic decline. . . . Article XI refers to 
situations in which a State has no choice but to act. A State may have several responses at 
its disposal to maintain public order or protect its essential security interests.210  
                                                                                                                                                                         
206. Cont’l Cas. Co. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/9, Award (Sept. 5, 
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207. Biwater Gauff (Tanzania) Ltd. v. United Republic of Tanzania, ICSID Case No. 
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2010] Private Litigation in a Public Law Sphere 325
While clearly drawing on elements of the least restrictive alternative 
standard, this portion of the LG&E tribunal’s analysis is also fully consistent 
with a margin of appreciation standard. Accepting that the economic crisis 
faced by Argentina required the swift adoption of an “across-the-board 
response,” 211  the tribunal effectively granted Argentina some freedom of 
choice in selecting the specific policy elements of that response without 
examining whether the means chosen by Argentina was in fact the least 
restrictive available in those circumstances.  
Other elements of the LG&E decision seem to reflect good faith review. 
The tribunal expressly noted that its substantive analysis did “not significantly 
differ from” the good faith review advocated by Argentina.212 In particular, 
the tribunal recognized that the measures adopted as part of the emergency 
legislation package were “necessary and legitimate” at the time, especially in 
light of the time pressures under which the government worked, and excused 
Argentina from liability for the period between December 1, 2001, and April 
26, 2003.213 The tribunal did not, however, further develop the good faith 
standard. The LG&E tribunal thus did not develop a clear standard of review, 
but employed elements of a number of standards seemingly pulled together 
without clear justification or consistency. 
The tribunal in Continental Casualty likewise moved away from the “no 
other means available” standard but, unlike LG&E, it more explicitly adopted 
the WTO’s least restrictive alternative approach. Yet once again, the 
Continental Casualty tribunal simultaneously drew on other standards without 
justification or jurisprudential coherence. The Continental Casualty tribunal, 
chaired by Giorgio Sacerdoti, an experienced WTO law expert, found 
Argentina’s actions fully justifiable under Article XI of the U.S.-Argentina 
BIT, citing WTO jurisprudence, including Korea—Beef, Brazil—Retreaded 
Tyres, and US—Gambling. Consistent with the WTO’s least restrictive 
alternative approach, the Continental Casualty tribunal found that the 
determination of “necessary” requires a two-step analysis. First, there must be 
a showing that the measures taken by a state contributed to a legitimate aim 
and, second, the tribunal must determine whether there were “reasonably 
available alternatives” more compliant with the states international obligations 
“while providing an equivalent contribution to the achievement of the 
objective pursued.”214 With respect to the first part of the test, the tribunal 
directly adopted the language from Brazil—Retreaded Tyres, observing:  
[W]ithin the economic and financial situation of Argentina towards the end of 2001, the 
Measures at issue . . . were in part inevitable, or unavoidable, in part indispensable and in 
any case material or decisive in order to react positively to the crisis, to prevent the 
complete break-down of the financial system, the implosion of the economy and the 
growing threat to the fabric of Argentinean society and generally to assist in overcoming 
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the crisis. In the Tribunal’s view, there was undoubtedly “a genuine relationship of end 
and means in this respect.”215 
With respect to the second prong of the test, the Continental Casualty 
tribunal determined after lengthy analysis that for each measure taken by 
Argentina there was not a reasonably available alternative that would have 
been less in conflict with Argentina’s international obligations. 216  It 
concluded: “The measures were sufficient in their design to address the crisis 
and were applied in a reasonable and proportionate way at the end of 2001-
2002.”217 
The most significant distinction between the least restrictive alternative 
test developed by the WTO and applied by the Continental Casualty tribunal 
and that used by some earlier ICSID tribunals relates to the nature of 
alternative measures that might have been available to Argentina. While some 
earlier tribunals found Argentina’s actions to fail the necessary test if there 
were any alternatives whatsoever, the Continental Casualty tribunal asked 
instead if there were reasonably available alternatives that would have met 
Argentina’s policy goals and been less incompatible with its international 
obligations.218 At the very least, such an inquiry requires a comparison of the 
course of action chosen by the state with other proffered ways of protecting its 
essential security interests. The Continental Casualty tribunal undertook just 
such an inquiry through a detailed consideration of each measure taken by 
Argentina and the range of possible alternatives before concluding that “such 
alternatives would not have been reasonably available or would have been 
impracticable or speculative as to their effects” and that, therefore “the 
measures [taken by Argentina] were necessary under Art. XI of the BIT.”219 
Despite the explicit references to WTO jurisprudence, the Continental 
Casualty tribunal appeared to draw simultaneously on the margin of 
appreciation in its analysis. The tribunal expressly recognized a “significant 
margin of appreciation for the State applying” measures under Article XI of 
the BIT. 220  In reaching this conclusion, the tribunal approvingly cited to 
Argentina’s reference to the ECtHR’s justification for such a margin on the 
basis of national authorities’ “direct knowledge of their society and its 
needs”221 and noted that “[a] certain deference to such a discretion when the 
application of general standards in a specific factual situation is at issue, such 
as reasonable, necessary, fair and equitable, may well be by now a general 
feature of international law also in respect of the protection of foreign 
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investors under BIT.”222 Notably, the tribunal furthermore acknowledged the 
relationship between the application of the margin doctrine and elements of 
good faith review. Although rejecting the self-judging nature of Article XI of 
the U.S.-Argentina BIT, which would have strengthened the claim for a 
residual good-faith-only standard of review, the tribunal concluded that the 
expression “its own security interests” contained in that provision “implies 
that a margin of appreciation must be afforded to the Party that claims in good 
faith that the interests addressed by the measure are essential security interests 
or that its public order is at stake,”223 suggesting that a tribunal called upon to 
assess the invocation of Article XI should honor such determinations as long 
as they had been made in good faith.  
Other ICSID tribunals have also been confronted with a choice of 
applicable standards of review, but have sought to avoid explicitly deciding 
what standards ought to apply. In these cases, respondent states have argued 
that their regulatory actions should be accorded a margin of appreciation, but 
the tribunals provided little, if any, discussion of the question. For example, in 
Biwater Gauff,224 U.K. investors undertook significant upgrades to the water 
and sewage system of Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. Through a series of 
regulatory measures, Tanzania imposed restrictions on Biwater Gauff and its 
operating companies that claimants deemed to constitute expropriations and 
violations of fair and equitable treatment in contravention of the 1994 BIT 
between the United Kingdom and Tanzania. 225  Citing to several ECtHR 
judgments, Tanzania argued that it “was entitled to a measure of 
appreciation,” and that “[w]ater and sanitation services are vitally important, 
and that the Republic has more than a right to protect such services in case of 
a crisis: it has a moral and perhaps even a legal obligation to do so.”226 
Ultimately, in Tanzania’s view, its actions to protect the water supply were 
“well within the Republic’s margin of appreciation under international 
law.”227 The tribunal rejected this argument on factual grounds with little 
consideration of the developing lines of jurisprudence on applicable standards 
of review.228  Without further reference to the margin of appreciation, the 
tribunal found only that “there was no necessity or impending public purpose 
to justify the Government’s intervention in the way that took place.”229 As a 
result, the Biwater Gauff tribunal largely reverted back to the strict scrutiny 
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test of the early ICSID cases, though without detailed consideration of 
alternative standards of review.  
Two other arbitrations warrant brief mention for their failure to address 
the standard of review applicable to public regulation by national authorities. 
In Siemens AG v. Argentine Republic, Argentina cited to the jurisprudence of 
the ECtHR, arguing that that court’s jurisprudence allowed lesser 
compensation in cases in which property deprivations were motivated by 
compelling social reasons. While Argentina invoked the margin of 
appreciation in its arguments, the ICSID tribunal merely stated without 
elaboration that the ECtHR affords a margin of appreciation not found in 
customary international law or in the Germany-Argentina BIT.230 Likewise, in 
National Grid p.l.c. v. Argentine Republic (National Grid), an UNCITRAL 
tribunal rejected Argentina’s invocation of the margin of appreciation, finding 
instead that the ICJ’s strict definition of “necessity” articulated in Gabčíkovo-
Nagymaros Project case was applicable.231  The reasoning of the National 
Grid tribunal is particularly problematic as it seeks to generalize a public law 
standard of review from the narrowly formulated necessity defense in 
customary international law.232 The tribunal did not even get to a substantive 
discussion of an appropriate standard of review.233 
The approach taken by ICSID tribunals in determining an appropriate 
standard of review in these public law international arbitrations has been 
deeply problematic. Some tribunals have failed to address the question at all, 
even when respondent state has expressly raised the issue. Other tribunals 
have borrowed somewhat haphazardly from a range of available standards in 
ways that are neither coherent nor consistent. Yet other tribunals have adopted 
extremely strict standards without regard to the public law context of the 
arbitration. No ICSID tribunal has engaged in a serious and considered 
treatment of the appropriate standard of review to apply in cases that raise 
public law issues. 
ICSID jurisprudence urgently needs a well-considered analysis of the 
available standards of review in public law arbitrations and the reasons why a 
particular standard are appropriate to the public law subject matter of these 
arbitrations and the text of the treaty being interpreted. We argue that such an 
analysis would point ICSID adjudicating public law disputes toward a far 
more deferential standard than they have applied to date, likely developed 
from the margin of appreciation standard. 
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B. Standards of Review and the Institutional Context of Judicial 
Decisionmaking 
The appropriateness of the margin of appreciation as a standard of 
review in public law arbitrations is further reinforced by the institutional 
context of judicial decisionmaking by ad hoc international arbitral tribunals. 
At a basic level, the primary function of all courts and tribunals, whether 
located at the domestic, transnational, or international level, is to resolve 
conflicts between at least two disputants by authoritatively determining their 
respective rights and obligations, interpreting and clarifying the meaning of 
the law, and evaluating the facts of the case against the applicable normative 
framework.234 Viewed in isolation, this “technical” aspect of the resolution of 
the legal conflict at issue is, in principle, compatible with all of the standards 
of review discussed above and does not privilege any one of them. Even a 
deferential good faith approach formally resolves the legal dispute by tending 
to leave the factual or normative situation unchanged (provided the 
requirements of the good faith standard are being met). But courts do not 
operate in a vacuum. Instead, they are embedded within broader political, 
legal and institutional environments that also empower other actors to 
generate generally binding decisions.235 Once courts are placed in the context 
of broader institutional structures for the governance of private and public 
affairs, questions arise as to the boundaries of each institutions’ jurisdiction 
and decision-making authority vis-à-vis other decision-making bodies.  
The very idea of “standards of review” recognizes this contextual 
placement of courts, serving to define the scope of judicial decisionmaking 
authority with respect to decisions made by other legitimate and duly 
constituted governance institutions within a given politico-legal environment. 
The standards of review discussed above cover a broad spectrum of relative 
institutional authorities, ranging from an expansive understanding of judicial 
decisionmaking authority (strict scrutiny review) to a limited, “backstop” 
function of judicial review (good faith review). What standard to choose, 
absent any plain constitutional, statutory or conventional stipulation, becomes, 
in our view, a question of the appropriateness of any particular standard of 
review to the specific institutional context in which the court or tribunal 
operates. That choice is important, as it may, in turn, affect the perceived 
legitimacy of the judicial institution as a whole. When a chosen standard is 
considered inappropriate by principal actors subject to the court’s or tribunal’s 
jurisdiction, the institution’s legitimacy as a whole is weakened and backlash 
may arise in the forms of decreased compliance, calls for institutional reform, 
or even, where possible, withdrawal from its jurisdiction. 
We argue that in determining whether a stricter or more lenient standard 
of review is appropriate,236 attention must be paid to courts’ and tribunals’ 
relative institutional capacity vis-à-vis other actors in a given institutional 
context. Within the category of institutional capacity, the element of expertise 
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should have pride of place. In other words, courts and tribunals should 
exercise strict scrutiny review of the acts of other governmental actors when 
they genuinely possess superior expertise in assessing and resolving the issues 
at stake. Where this is not the case, they should adopt a more deferential 
standard of review with more respect to the assessments and decisions made 
by those actors that have a more compelling claim to possessing such 
expertise. 
The expertise of a tribunal contains two interrelated, but analytically 
distinct aspects. The first is legal and technical expertise. A court should 
engage in substantive review notably when it can claim superior legal and 
technical expertise in the relevant area of law as well as the underlying subject 
area, as compared to the original decision-making body. Only then is there a 
high probability that the resulting decision will be legally sound and 
substantively superior to those of other decisionmakers, a key quality in 
eliciting legitimacy and compliance.237 In cases involving public law or quasi-
constitutional disputes, such sound legal reasoning requires both recognition 
that a dispute is situated within a public law context in the first place and 
expertise in decision rules or standards of review derived from, and 
appropriate to, that context.  
Domestic tribunals, such as those discussed in Section IV.B, above, tend 
to have both the legal and technical expertise to engage in deep substantive 
review and are often, therefore, well equipped and properly situated to 
employ, in appropriate circumstances, strict standards of review. In contrast, 
however, ICSID arbitrators rarely have public or constitutional law 
backgrounds. ICSID does not require arbitrators to have public law 
expertise.238 Most ICSID arbitrators come from the world of private practice 
or from government positions such as finance ministries, which do not 
generally lead to legal expertise,239 at least not in the broad sense required for 
the adjudication of a diverse range of public law issues.240 As a result, more 
often than not, a tribunal will have few if any arbitrators with public law 
expertise or mindset. Without such expertise on an ICSID panel, it is perhaps 
not surprising that tribunals rarely turn to public law approaches or standards 
of review in their analysis. 
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The second aspect of expertise is somewhat harder to grasp, but, we 
believe, equally relevant. This aspect concerns the extent to which third-party 
dispute settlers are embedded within the social, political and legal 
environment within which they operate. Most tribunals—both domestic and 
international—that engage in public law adjudication, especially if they have 
jurisdiction to decide issues of a public law nature and, perhaps, of 
constitutional significance, are situated within the normative, political, and 
legal community whose policies they adjudicate.241 Take, for example, the 
U.S. Supreme Court. While its Justices are insulated from day to day politics, 
they are selected from and remain rooted in the U.S. political community.242 
That embeddedness, we contend, appropriately situates domestic courts to 
calibrate the standards of review outlined in Section IV.B to the nature of the 
dispute and, where appropriate, to engage in, for example, strict scrutiny 
review in the case of suspect classifications in the U.S. system. 
Like domestic tribunals, most international tribunals called upon to 
engage in public law adjudication have ties that ground the tribunal in the 
norms and values of the state whose policies are being considered. For 
example, the International Court of Justice allows each party who does not 
have a national on the court to choose a judge to sit for that particular case.243 
Similarly, the European Court of Justice includes one judge from each of the 
EU member states.244 Moreover, the judges who serve on these courts are, at 
least in part, selected for their experience with or expertise in public law 
disputes. 245  Their self-identity and understanding of their own role in 
adjudication is likely to be grounded in public law sensibilities. 
It is in part these linkages between adjudicators and the states whose 
policies they are reviewing—whether achieved through the selection of judges 
and arbitrators or political review of decisions—as well as the public law 
mindset of adjudicators, that imbue these institutions with the legitimacy to 
make decisions with broad public policy ramifications. Such judges, even if 
sitting at an international tribunal, have the background and experience to 
understand both the law they are applying and the context in which it is being 
applied. States are likely to respect and obey them because of their 
understandings of social and political context and their ability to convey that 
understanding in their opinions. Similarly, where decisions must be accepted 
by national governments and their polities, those judges must understand and 
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demonstrate through sound reasoning their understanding of the political and 
social contexts of their decisions.246  
One might expect ICSID arbitrators to be more closely linked to, and 
informed of, the context of their cases than judges in other international fora. 
After all, parties to ICSID disputes select their own arbitrators.247 Yet ICSID 
tribunals often lack these legitimating connections for two reasons. First, an 
ICSID arbitrator on the standard three-member panel cannot have the same 
nationality as a party to a dispute unless the opposing party agrees, something 
that occurs only rarely.248 Second, because each side is able to appoint one 
arbitrator who is likely to disagree with the arbitrator appointed by the 
opposing party, the president of the tribunal who, by definition, cannot be a 
national of the state party, wields extraordinary influence on the outcome and 
the drafting of the award.249 As the president must be mutually agreeable to 
both parties or selected by the Chairman of ICSID,250 the decisive voice of the 
president is likely to have little or no connection with the state party to the 
dispute nor any meaningful familiarity with the political and social context 
thereof.  
The lack of familiarity with national context and the lack of public law 
experience of ICSID tribunals can undermine those tribunals’ perceived 
legitimacy and, hence, the willingness of states to comply with their awards. 
As Shany explains:  
[T]he physical detachment of international courts from their national societies whose 
compliance with the law they assess exacerbates their lack of expertise. While national 
courts are generally familiar with local conditions, which influence the manner of 
application of international norms, this is hardly the case with international courts . . . . 
As a result, national actors (including national courts) seem to be better situated than 
international courts to establish the facts underlying law-application processes.251  
Generally, the greater embeddedness of a tribunal in a state’s socio-
political context justifies and supports the application of more strict scrutiny 
by the tribunal. In contrast, lack of embeddedness suggests the need for 
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greater deference to decisions made by institutions that are more culturally, 
legally, and politically embedded. Such embeddedness and proximity to the 
issues at stake serves certain functions that cannot be easily replicated. Not 
only are those closer to the issues better positioned to make factual 
assessments of the situation252—a standard ECtHR argument in support of the 
margin of appreciation—but widely shared cultural, political, and legal 
assumptions and understandings also tend to inform judicial as well as 
political decisionmaking. A common set of assumptions and understandings 
between the state and the tribunal may thus generate greater perceived 
legitimacy because decisions resonate better with the culture and values of the 
relevant environment than decisions that show disregard for such common 
assumptions and understandings.253  
Unlike many international tribunals discussed in Section IV.A and the 
domestic tribunals considered in Section IV.B, international investment 
tribunals should, on grounds of institutional capacity and relative 
embeddedness, generally refrain from applying searching standards of review 
to public law disputes and, instead, adopt more deferential postures toward 
respondent states. The application of strict scrutiny in effect authorizes a 
tribunal to fully evaluate all aspects of a case up to the point of substituting 
any assessments made by the governmental actors in the case with its own. At 
the international level, especially in the case of temporary, free-floating ad 
hoc tribunals, such an approach is generally inappropriate and will likely 
result in a reduction of perceived legitimacy, at least from the perspective of 
respondent states. The least restrictive alternative test, while also enabling a 
tribunal to conduct a full review, provides at least some deference to national 
decisionmaking, as it shifts the burden of proof to the claimant if the 
respondent state can make a reasonable prima facie case that the means 
chosen was, at the time, the least restrictive means available. While the good 
faith standard provides the broadest deference, such drastic judicial self-
restraint allocates only a residual supervisory role to courts and tribunals and 
is warranted only where the relevant treaty text specifically calls for it. In the 
next Section we will argue that, overall, the margin of appreciation provides 
the most suitable standard of review for public-law-related investor-state 
arbitrations. 
C. Paths Forward: The Margin of Appreciation and Proportionality 
Analysis 
Given the unique characteristics of public law adjudication in 
international arbitration and the problematic ICSID jurisprudence to date, a 
new approach to reviewing state regulatory behavior is urgently needed. 
Ultimately, any standard of review that grants an appropriate degree of 
deference to national authorities undertaking public regulation, while still 
protecting investor rights, is preferable to the problematic status quo. ICSID 
tribunals must seriously analyze the standards of review appropriate to the 
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unique circumstances of public law arbitration and move toward a more 
coherent and consistent jurisprudence.  
1. The Margin of Appreciation and Proportionality Analysis in 
Theory 
One approach to developing an alternative standard of review based on 
existing models is to recognize that many of the potential standards on which 
international arbitral tribunals could draw are forms of proportionality 
analysis, similar to those employed by the German Federal Constitutional 
Court. As Alec Stone Sweet and Jud Mathews argue, proportionality analysis 
has become “the preferred procedure for managing . . . an alleged conflict 
between two rights claims, or between a rights provision and a legitimate state 
. . . interest.”254 They describe proportionality analysis in its various forms as 
a four-step process. First is a “legitimacy” step in which the “judge confirms 
that the government is constitutionally-authorized to take such a measure.”255 
Second is a “suitability” step in which a judge ensures that “the means 
adopted by the government are rationally related to the stated policy 
objectives.”256 Third is a “necessity” step, which, in their view, is equivalent 
to a least restrictive means test.257 Finally, a court applying proportionality 
analysis will engage in “balancing stricto senso [sic],” in which the judge 
weighs the “benefits of the act . . . against the costs incurred by infringement 
of the right.”258 Stone Sweet and Mathews describe this approach as a “new 
constitutionalism.”259 Throughout the Subsections that follow, we use Stone 
Sweet and Mathews’ approach to proportionality to inform our articulation of 
the margin of appreciation as both a standard of review and as a counterpoint 
to highlight the distinct nature of margin analysis. 
Many of the alternate standards of review that we have discussed and on 
which international arbitral tribunals could draw are variants of 
proportionality analysis. The least restrictive alternative standard as used by 
the WTO is perhaps the clearest example.260  Similarly, the German FCC 
(discussed in Section IV.B) has relied heavily on proportionality analysis, 
which in fact developed out of early German jurisprudence.261 In contrast, the 
early ICSID awards rejected proportionality analysis by refusing to recognize 
that a balancing of rights was necessary at all.  
Elsewhere, Stone Sweet argues that the more recent ICSID tribunals in 
the Argentine cases are engaged in a “flirtation with proportionality 
balancing” and notes that in Continental Casualty, the tribunal “adopted a 
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mature form of proportionality analysis.”262 Stone Sweet goes on to argue that 
proportionality analysis ought to be the preferred means of resolving rights 
conflicts in international public law adjudication263 and that “it would be wise 
for ICSID tribunals to embrace the proportionality framework.”264  
We wholeheartedly agree with Stone Sweet that if ICSID tribunals were 
to consistently embrace proportionality analysis it would be a significant 
advance over the jurisprudential status quo. Embracing proportionality 
analysis would address many of our concerns with the approach of ICSID 
tribunals to date, particularly the private law mindset and the lack of balancing 
among competing rights so evident in the early “no other means available” 
standard. Similarly, we agree with Stone Sweet that “adopting proportionality 
would give ICSID tribunals important advantages in coping with the 
increasing politicization of investor-State arbitration” and would likely 
enhance the overall legitimacy of the investor-state arbitration system.265 
We disagree, however, with two basic propositions of Stone Sweet’s 
analysis. First, while it is true that the Continental Casualty tribunal flirted 
with proportionality, it is far from clear that, as he claims, “the positions taken 
by ICSID tribunals in CMS, Enron, and Sempra [the tribunals that maintained 
a strict, no other means available standard] have now been destroyed.”266 
Admittedly, the annulment committee in CMS scathingly critiqued the award 
rendered by the CMS tribunal. That annulment committee report, however, is 
not binding on other tribunals and the weight of jurisprudence to date still tips 
in favor of the strict “no other means available” standard used by the first 
three tribunals in the Argentina cases. Hence, we find that the trajectory of 
ICSID jurisprudence is far less clear and far more troubling than does Stone 
Sweet. While ICSID tribunals may move further in the direction of 
proportionality analysis, they also may remain stuck in the “no other means 
available” approach or move toward a different standard entirely. 
Second, we disagree with Stone Sweet’s conclusion that proportionality 
analysis necessarily “offers to arbitrators the best available doctrinal 
framework with which to meet the present challenges to the BIT-ICSID 
system.”267 While we recognize that proportionality is a viable approach and 
preferable to the status quo, the peculiarities of public law investor-state 
arbitration may argue in favor of a different approach. Specifically, the 
effectiveness and legitimacy of standards of review based on proportionality 
analysis turn on the ability of judges or arbitrators to balance among 
competing rights or interests and to convince both states and investors that 
they have struck the appropriate balance. As Stone Sweet and Mathews 
observe: 
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Judges have embraced proportionality for similar reasons. Given the constitutional texts 
they have been asked to interpret and enforce, [proportionality analysis] made it easy for 
them to prioritize the values that the polity itself has chosen to prioritize, even in the 
difficult situations in which these values would come into tension or conflict.268  
Yet prioritization of the values chosen by the polity requires both familiarity 
with those values and a degree of embeddedness within that polity. It is our 
contention that ad hoc ICSID tribunals lack the institutional capacity to base 
their determinations primarily on such direct balancing and to convince 
skeptical audiences of the legitimacy of their balancing outcomes. 
Stone Sweet and Mathews make, if inadvertently, perhaps the best case 
against the expertise and capacity of ICSID tribunals to engage in direct 
balancing. They note first that “balancing can never be dissociated from 
lawmaking: it requires judges to behave as legislators do, or to sit in judgment 
on a prior act of balancing performed by elected officials.”269 It is, in their 
words, a “difficult judicial task involving complex policy considerations.”270 
Moreover, “in balancing situations, it is context that varies, and it is the 
judge’s reading of context—the circumstances, fact patterns, and policy 
considerations at play in any case—that determines outcomes.”271  
The inherent problem with ICSID tribunals engaging in the direct 
balancing at the heart of proportionality analysis is that they are not well 
positioned or equipped to engage in lawmaking, to internalize the context, and 
to weigh the policy considerations at play in a particular case. As we have 
argued above, ICSID arbitrators are far removed from the polities over whom 
they exercise control. 272  They often lack expertise in the particular 
circumstances and fact patterns of the case.273 They are not embedded in the 
polities or policies at stake. As a result, ICSID tribunals are in a uniquely poor 
position to engage in the direct balancing necessary for effective and 
legitimate proportionality analysis.  
Moreover, proportionality analysis alone is unlikely to overcome the 
legitimacy gap in investor-state arbitration. Ad hoc arbitral tribunals’ lack of 
expertise in public law and lack of connection with domestic polities is 
obvious to those impacted by the tribunals’ awards—the national government 
and the polity of the state whose policies are being reviewed. In such 
circumstances, proportionality balancing by ad hoc arbitral tribunals is 
unlikely to enhance perceptions of legitimacy, precisely because the ad hoc 
tribunal lacks the requisite capacities and is not seen as possessing the 
necessary expertise and understanding to engage in direct balancing, much 
less legislating. 
Within a constitutional framework, proportionality analysis may be an 
ideal mechanism for judicial balancing. Yet outside such a constitutional 
context, and particularly in the case of ad hoc ICSID arbitration, an alternative 
approach that moves away from the “no other means available” standard 
                                                                                                                                                                         
268. Stone Sweet & Mathews, supra note 254, at 160. 
269. Id. at 88. 
270. Id. at 89. 
271. Id. 
272. See supra Section V.B. 
273. See supra Section V.B. 
2010] Private Litigation in a Public Law Sphere 337
applied by the early Argentine tribunals but that does not become an exercise 
in direct balancing by disconnected ad hoc arbitrators is preferable. We find 
that the margin of appreciation is the best solution, precisely because it 
provides a means to resolve conflicts between rights and interests without 
putting an ad hoc ICSID tribunal in the position of undertaking direct 
balancing without a frame of reference. 
As we showed in detail in Subsection IV.A.2, the margin of appreciation 
allows a tribunal to set an appropriate space within which national authorities 
are able to take regulatory action without a tribunal second-guessing those 
decisions or acting in a legislative capacity. Again, national authorities are 
generally better positioned, both in terms of expertise and embeddedness 
within the domestic polity to engage in an explicit balancing between rights 
and interests at stake than is an international arbitral tribunal.274 By adopting 
the margin of appreciation as the relevant standard of review, the international 
arbitral tribunal would sit in a supervisory capacity akin to that of the ECtHR, 
reviewing whether the measures adopted by a respondent state remain within 
the government’s recognized margin of appreciation and whether any 
resulting interference is sufficiently justified, but without substituting its own 
assessments as to the most appropriate policy in a given case.275 
Admittedly, adopting the margin of appreciation does not fully do away 
with the difficulties presented by ad hoc tribunals engaging in rights 
balancing. The margin of appreciation itself includes a residual balancing test. 
Yet adopting the margin of appreciation shifts the nature and location of that 
balancing from a direct comparison of a national regulation and a state’s 
interests on one side, with investor rights on the other, to a determination of 
the appropriate width of the margin for a particular type of rights or interests, 
and a residual consideration of the justification for interference with 
individual rights.276  
As a matter of institutional capacity, ad hoc international tribunals are 
far better positioned to set the appropriate contours of a margin of discretion 
for national authorities than they are to directly balance rights and interests for 
two basic reasons. First, determining the breadth of a margin of appreciation 
requires an order of magnitude calculation that captures the weight of the state 
interests and investor rights at stake, rather than an explicit balancing of those 
rights and interests.277 Second, reliance on the margin of appreciation allows 
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for the development of broad categories of rights—such as the right to 
property addressed under Protocol 1 to the European Convention. Tribunals 
can then apply a corresponding margin of appreciation of uniform breadth to 
that whole category of rights, thereby avoiding the need for deeply context-
dependent decisions by nonembedded judges. The result is both greater 
consistency and predictability of outcomes.278  
Admittedly, the margin of appreciation involves a second analytic 
step—a residual consideration of whether, even for regulatory activities that 
fall within the margin of appreciation, any resulting interference with 
individual rights is sufficiently justified. That analysis may require a degree of 
balancing between the interests of the state and the interference with 
individual rights. However, this balancing is residual, not direct. It only comes 
after the primary determinations of the width of the margin and whether the 
state’s regulatory activities fall within that margin. Moreover, in margin of 
appreciation analysis, the residual balancing can be informed and guided by 
the analytically prior step—the determination of the breadth of the margin.279 
Where the margin of appreciation is broad, and the state’s activity clearly 
within it, the residual proportionality test can be less searching. In contrast, if 
the margin is narrow or the state’s activity falls closer to the edge of that 
margin, proportionality balancing can be stricter. Ad hoc tribunals will be 
better positioned to undertake balancing in such circumstances if they can 
ground the residual proportionality analysis in the preliminary determination 
of the breadth of the margin. Residual proportionality analysis is thus a far 
easier and more appropriate task for ad hoc tribunals than free-standing 
proportionality analysis, since the preliminary determination of the width of 
the margin provides guideposts, context, and a framework for the residual 
proportionality analysis. 
For similar reasons, the margin of appreciation is preferable not just to 
proportionality analysis itself, but also to the various standards for reviewing 
state behavior that we considered in Part IV. Ad hoc arbitral tribunals are 
poorly equipped to engage in least restrictive means analysis as developed by 
the WTO. Specifically, such least restrictive means analysis requires the 
tribunal to consider other available alternatives and second-guess government 
regulatory behavior. Just as ICSID tribunals lack the legislative-type 
capacities to engage in direct balancing, so too do they lack the knowledge, 
expertise and resources to engage in the kind of second-guessing of policy 
choices required by a least restrictive means analysis. In addition, as a second 
step, the WTO least restrictive means approach includes an explicit 
proportionality balancing test, for which we have already established that ad 
hoc tribunals are poorly positioned. 
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The margin of appreciation is also preferable in most circumstances to 
more lenient standards such as good faith review. While our argument that ad 
hoc ICSID tribunals lack the capacity for legitimate direct balancing taken to a 
logical extreme might point toward good faith review that requires only a 
rationality analysis, good faith review may not always offer sufficient 
protection of investor rights.280 Given that the object and purpose of most 
BITs and the clear goal of the whole investor-state arbitration regime is to 
provide at least some protection for investors, a standard that merely imposes 
reasonableness, honesty, and fair dealing requirements may be inadequate to 
protect investor rights. The margin of appreciation, in contrast, more narrowly 
limits the realm of deference to national authorities and includes a residual 
consideration of whether interference with individual rights is justified. Acting 
in its supervisory capacity, a tribunal employing the margin of appreciation 
can still intervene when national authorities exceed the appropriate margin or 
engage in unjustified interference with individual rights, thereby providing far 
greater protections to investors than would a good faith standard. 
Compared to other available standards of review, the margin of 
appreciation also promotes legitimacy, and perhaps even accountability, by 
returning national authorities to the center of decisionmaking and placing the 
ad hoc arbitral tribunal, with fewer connections to the domestic polity and 
potentially far less expertise, in the more limited supervisory position.281 As 
Yuval Shany contends, the margin of appreciation “improves the quality and 
perceived legitimacy of legal pronouncements,”282 because it no longer has to 
convince potentially skeptical audiences of the accuracy of a direct balancing 
process.  
2. The Margin of Appreciation and Proportionality Analysis in 
Practice 
The distinctions between proportionality analysis and the margin of 
appreciation, as well as the greater appropriateness of the margin of 
appreciation to public law disputes before ad hoc investment tribunals, are 
most clearly demonstrated through a concrete example. This Subsection takes 
the basic dispute raised in cases such as CMS, LG&E and Continental 
Casualty over the applicability of Article XI of the U.S.-Argentina BIT and 
traces the different processes of analysis based first on proportionality review 
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and then on the margin of appreciation. Though both standards would likely 
lead to the same conclusion—the applicability of Article XI and a finding that 
Argentina was not liable for a breach of the BIT—the analytic processes at 
work are notably different. Specifically, the margin of appreciation offers a far 
more tractable approach, more appropriate to the institutional context of an ad 
hoc investment tribunal. 
As a preliminary matter, it is necessary to determine whether the dispute 
itself falls within the public law sphere to which our argument for alternative 
standards of review applies. In this case, the dispute is undoubtedly of a public 
law nature, both in terms of its subject matter and the text of the treaty being 
interpreted. In terms of substance, Argentina faced a massive economic 
collapse and had to devise a policy to prevent further economic turmoil, move 
toward economic recovery, and avoid the complete breakdown of 
governmental authority.283 To that end, Argentina implemented measures that 
were damaging to investor interests, including freezes on tariff rate 
adjustments, currency restrictions, and devaluations.284 Claims by investors 
challenging these policies meet Abram Chayes’s test for matters of public law 
in that investors had a “grievance about the operation of public policy” and 
were not merely private individuals seeking to enforce private rights. 285 
Second, the dispute meets the textual requirements we set forth for the 
application of alternative standards of review. Specifically, Article XI of the 
U.S.-Argentina BIT, asserted as a defense by Argentina, states: “This Treaty 
shall not preclude the application by either Party of measures necessary for the 
maintenance of public order . . . or the Protection of its own essential security 
interests.”286 The term “necessary” implies a subjective balancing test and the 
references to both “public order” and “essential security” are indicative of 
public law choices. As a result, this is just the type of public law dispute to 
which an ad hoc international investment tribunal should apply an alternative 
standard of review. 
Take first the application of proportionality analysis to the dispute. Stone 
Sweet and Mathews suggest that proportionality analysis involves a four-step 
test: legitimacy, suitability, necessity, and balancing.287 The first three steps of 
the test are relatively straightforward. First, the arbitral tribunal must confirm 
the legitimacy of Argentina’s actions by asking if the government was 
constitutionally empowered to act as it did. In this case, the answer would be 
in the affirmative.288 Second, the tribunal should consider the suitability of 
Argentina’s acts by determining whether “the means adopted by the 
government are rationally related to the stated policy objectives.”289 Whether 
or not one agrees with Argentina’s particular policy choices, tariff adjustment 
                                                                                                                                                                         
283. See, e.g., LG&E Energy Corp. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/1, 
Decision on Liability (Oct. 3, 2006), http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=Cases 
RH&actionVal=showDoc&docId=DC627_En&caseId=C208. 
284. See id. 
285. See Chayes, supra note 7, at 1302. 
286. U.S.-Argentina BIT, supra note 37, art. XI. 
287. Stone Sweet & Mathews, supra note 254, at 74. 
288. The constitutionality of Argentina’s actions has not been challenged in any of the ICSID 
cases against it to date. 
289. Stone Sweet & Mathews, supra note 254, at 74. 
2010] Private Litigation in a Public Law Sphere 341
freezes, currency restrictions, and currency revaluations are rationally related 
to preventing further economic crises and managing an economic recovery. 
Third, the tribunal would engage in a necessity analysis. While the cases 
against Argentina clearly indicate the range of interpretations of necessity,290 
Stone Sweet and Mathews suggest that, under proportionality analysis, 
necessity should be equivalent to a least restrictive means test. At least 
according to the findings of the Continental Casualty tribunal, Argentina’s 
actions would satisfy such a least restrictive means test in that there were no 
reasonably available alternative measures that would have caused less 
infringement on investor rights.291 
While the first three steps of proportionality analysis are relatively 
straightforward and tractable, it is the fourth step suggested by Stone Sweet 
and Mathews that demonstrates the difficulty of proportionality analysis for ad 
hoc tribunals. Specifically, a tribunal engaging in balancing must “weigh the 
benefits of the act . . . against the costs incurred by the infringement of the 
right.”292 In so doing, the tribunal will acknowledge “that each side has some 
significant constitutional right on its side” but will then have to “make a 
decision” between those competing rights.293 How should the tribunal balance 
the state’s right to regulate so as to avoid further crises and investor rights 
under the BIT and various contracts? Do investors’ property rights trump the 
state’s right to its continued existence or individual citizens’ rights to safety 
and security? How should the rights dispute even be framed?294 While our 
view is that the tribunal should accord preference to the continued existence of 
the state and the safety of individuals from public riots over investor property, 
that outcome is not necessarily a given and depends in large part on the 
preferences and predilections of arbitrators, many of whom in the ICSID 
context are themselves private litigators. 
The problem for an ad hoc investment tribunal is that it lacks the 
contextual knowledge, the expertise in the particular issues at stake, and the 
embeddedness in the social fabric of the dispute necessary to engage in this 
balancing process. Most other tribunals that undertake balancing sensu stricto 
are, in contrast, deeply familiar with the context of the dispute and embedded 
in the socio-political system in which the dispute arises.295 In fact, the very 
sources on which Stone Sweet and Mathews rely for their proposition that 
proportionality balancing has been constitutionalized are domestic tribunals 
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that are, not surprisingly, deeply embedded within their social and political 
systems. 296  In order to engage in the balancing necessary to complete 
proportionality analysis, arbitrators must “behave as legislators do, or . . . sit 
in judgment of a prior act of balancing performed by elected officials.”297 Yet 
they must do so without context, expertise, or any cues to help them weigh 
competing constitutional values. Their judgments are, therefore, at best 
arbitrary or, at worst, personal predispositions. 
Contrast this approach with the application of the margin of 
appreciation. The margin of appreciation analysis starts with a determination 
of the appropriate width of the margin or “breadth of deference”298 in the 
particular case. The ECtHR has a well-developed jurisprudence for 
determining the appropriate breadth of the margin of appreciation based on 
the nature of the rights in conflict.299 Here we have a case that involves the 
state’s fundamental social and economic policies on one side and investors’ 
property rights on the other. In the jurisprudence of the ECtHR, property 
rights are less fundamental than, say, the right to life, and hence are indicative 
of a comparatively wider margin within which states can choose how to 
regulate. 300  Similarly, regulation of socioeconomic policies in the public 
interest is generally accorded a wide margin. As the ECtHR observed in 
Broniowski, since “the margin of appreciation available to the legislature in 
implementing social and economic policies should be a wide one, [the Court] 
will respect the legislature’s judgment as to what is ‘in the public interest’ 
unless that judgment is manifestly without reasonable foundation.”301 
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As a result, the rights on both sides of the dispute are indicative of a 
wide margin such that the state’s regulatory choices would only be overturned 
by the international tribunal acting in a supervisory capacity if those choices 
were without reasonable foundation. Argentina’s actions clearly have 
reasonable foundation—they were intended to mitigate the economic crisis 
and promote economic recovery. Argentina’s actions would, therefore, fall 
within the allowable margin of appreciation afforded by Article XI of the 
U.S.-Argentina BIT. 
The margin of appreciation analysis then proceeds to a second step, a 
residual proportionality test,302 identical in form to that advanced by Stone 
Sweet and Mathews. As we discussed in Part IV and Subsection V.C.1, the 
residual proportionality test in margin analysis should be informed by the 
prior determination of the width of the margin of appreciation afforded in the 
particular case. The first three steps of the proportionality analysis approach 
would proceed just as they did under the proportionality analysis in isolation, 
as described above. However, with respect to the fourth step—balancing sensu 
stricto—proportionality balancing under the margin of appreciation differs 
from proportionality balancing in isolation. Specifically, when engaging in 
residual balancing as part of the margin of appreciation analysis, the tribunal 
has the benefit of already having determined the breadth of the margin of 
appreciation and can use the breadth of the margin as a cue to determine the 
strictness of the balancing test to be imposed. In this case, with a wide margin 
of appreciation, the balancing test should be relatively light and, likely, tip in 
favor of the state’s own determination of what it sees as an appropriate 
balance, unless that balance struck by the national government is blatantly 
unreasonable and out of proportion.  
In contrast, if the margin were narrower, for example in a case of 
freedom of expression, the balancing test would be more searching and likely 
tip in favor of the aggrieved individual whenever the balance struck by the 
state failed to pass muster under a stricter version of the proportionality test.303 
In the Argentina case, using the initial determination of the width of the 
margin to inform the residual balancing test makes a tribunal’s analysis of 
Argentina’s regulatory activity far more clear. Given a relatively light 
balancing test based on the wide margin of appreciation in a case involving 
property rights and a state’s essential security, the alteration of tariff 
adjustment rates and limitations on currency exchange imposed by Argentina 
would be proportionate to the ends it sought. The limited infringement on 
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investors’ rights would, therefore, be justified. As a result, the tribunal would 
find Argentina’s actions fell within Article XI of the U.S.-Argentina BIT. 
The principal difference, then, between proportionality analysis and the 
margin of appreciation, is that the margin of appreciation allows residual 
balancing to be guided by an initial determination of the breadth of the 
margin. That initial determination does not, however, require direct balancing, 
but rather an order-of-magnitude calculation based on the nature of the rights 
at stake and, possibly, guided by a well developed ECtHR jurisprudence as to 
the appropriate contours of the margin of appreciation when different rights 
are at stake. As a result, an ad hoc arbitral tribunal unfamiliar with the context 
of the dispute and disconnected from the socio-political system in which the 
dispute arises can avoid the difficulties of balancing in isolation by taking 
cues from the initial determination of the breadth of the margin in the case. In 
so doing, the tribunal more accurately employs its relative expertise and acts 
appropriately given its institutional context. 
Ultimately, while we laud the move to greater deference exhibited by the 
ICSID tribunal in Continental Casualty, we are not convinced that the award 
marks an explicit turn toward proportionality analysis or that ICSID tribunals 
should wholeheartedly embrace proportionality in isolation. ICSID tribunals 
urgently need to move toward a consistent and coherent standard of review, 
whether based on proportionality, the least restrictive alternative or even good 
faith. Any of these standards would more appropriately reflect the new public 
law context of much investor-state arbitration. Yet a better standard of review 
based both on institutional capacity of ad hoc arbitral tribunals and the need 
for domestic legitimacy of their awards, may well be found in the more 
explicit and better developed application of the margin of appreciation. Such a 
standard of review would appropriately place ad hoc tribunals in an 
international supervisory capacity, minimizing the direct balancing for which 
they are poorly positioned and allowing them to focus their analysis on the 
determination of the contours of a margin of appreciation for public regulation 
by national governments in different categories of cases. 
VI. CONCLUSION  
As states react to the extraordinary awards against Argentina, consider 
the troubled jurisprudence of many ICSID tribunals, and watch the growing 
number of arbitrations that challenge public regulation, the legitimacy of 
ICSID and the future of investor-state arbitration are being called into 
question. While this legitimacy gap has been widely recognized, most 
proposed solutions have called for structural changes in the ICSID system, 
such as the establishment of an appellate mechanism. Yet these changes 
would be difficult to implement, as they require revision of the ICSID 
Convention and might well undermine many of the benefits of arbitration, 
such as efficiency and finality. 
In contrast with these proposed solutions, we have identified an 
underlying cause of this legitimacy deficit: the fact that, despite the new 
public law subject matter of many ICSID arbitrations, ICSID tribunals 
continue to apply standards of review developed from and more appropriate to 
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the private, contract law origins of international arbitration. Recognition of 
this new public law context of investment arbitration and the development of 
appropriate public law standards of review that allow for some deference to 
national authorities are urgently needed. The application of such public law 
standards of review would go far to help close the legitimacy gap by 
demonstrating to states that ICSID tribunals recognize and take account of the 
competing interests of both states and investors in public law arbitration. 
Various standards of review appropriate to public law disputes and 
routinely used both by other international tribunals and by domestic courts are 
available to ICSID tribunals. Any such public law standards of review that 
balance between a state’s public interest and investor rights would be far 
preferable to the confused and contradictory standards presently employed by 
ICSID tribunals and all too evident in the awards against Argentina. Yet the 
unique circumstances and limited institutional capacity of ad hoc arbitral 
tribunals suggest the need for a relatively deferential standard that minimizes 
the second-guessing of state policies and the direct balancing of state and 
investor interests by such tribunals. The margin of appreciation does just that, 
allowing the ad hoc tribunal to focus on the determination of an appropriate 
margin of appreciation in a particular type of case and then using that 
preliminary determination of the breadth of the margin to ground the residual 
review of the degree of interference posed by a state’s action.  
We recognize that such a shift in standards of review may be criticized 
as reducing the level of protection accorded to investors and, thereby, 
weakening the overall investor-state arbitral system. In our view, however, 
such criticism is misplaced for three key reasons. First, we only advocate the 
use of an alternative standard of review in that relatively narrow but important 
subset of cases and subset of issues within those cases in which matters of 
public law arise before the arbitral tribunal. In the vast majority of cases in 
which such issues do not arise, our proposal would neither alter standards of 
review nor the level of protection accorded investors. Second, while giving 
greater deference to decisions by national governments, the margin of 
appreciation still protects investor interests, allowing the international tribunal 
to intervene in favor of investors when a state’s regulations exceed the margin 
of appreciation or otherwise fail the residual proportionality test. Finally, to 
the degree that our proposal does in fact reduce the protections available for 
investors,304 those greater risks to investors can be priced into investments 
themselves. In an efficient market for international investment, the price paid 
by states for foreign investments (presumably in terms of rates of return on the 
investment) should reflect the degree of risk assumed by investors. To the 
degree our proposal increases those risks, investors should receive 
commensurately higher returns on their investments.305 
Movement toward a public law standard of review such as the margin of 
appreciation is relatively easy to implement. In contrast with the difficult 
process of amending the ICSID Convention, as others have proposed, ICSID 
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tribunals can directly adopt new standards of review through gradual 
jurisprudential development and harmonization. Without an appellate 
authority, however, tribunals will have to engage in a dialogue with one 
another through their awards as they move to a common public law standard 
of review. That, in turn, may require a shift in the mindset and even identity of 
arbitrators themselves. Rather than seeing themselves as the first order 
decisionmakers in a private dispute, ICSID arbitrators should come to 
understand their role as public law actors and recognize that their awards have 
impacts well beyond the direct case at hand. Confronted with that new 
identity, ICSID arbitrators may recognize that they are far better equipped to 
play a supervisory role, as appropriate to a margin of appreciation, rather than 
engage in the second-guessing of state policies and the direct balancing of 
state interests and investor rights in public law arbitration. 
